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The Uniform Commercial Code Meets the
Seventh Amendment: The Demise of Jury
Trials Under Article 5?
MARGARET L. MOSEs*
This Article will examine the right to a jury trial in a letter of credit case, and
whether revised section 5-108(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.")'
violates that right. It will consider the historical use of jury trials in letter of
credit cases, and will examine the constitutional implications of revised section
5-108(e), both with respect to the Seventh Amendment and state constitutional
law.
The policies and goals underlying revised section 5-108(e) will be considered,
as well as the drafters' proffered justifications for assigning to the court in this
subsection questions of fact normally decided by juries. The Article concludes
that revised section 5-108(e) unconstitutionally abridges the jury's role both in
deciding disputed factual issues and in drawing inferences from the evidence. It
also concludes that even assuming no constitutional defect, the proposed revision
will not promote the stated goals of efficiency, predictability, speed, and
uniformity.
In revising Article 5 of the U.C.C., the drafters' stated intent was to promote
more consistent outcomes and speedier resolution of disputes in letter of credit
litigation.2 As a means of accomplishing these goals, they delegated to the court
fact questions which historically were determined by a jury. Revised section 5-
108, entitled "Issuer's Rights and Obligations," provides in subsection (e): "An
issuer shall observe standard practice of financial institutions that regularly issue
letters of credit. Determination of the issuer's observance of the standard
practice is a matter of interpretation for the court. The court shall offer the
parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence of the standard practice."3
The second sentence of this subsection is carefully crafted to take an ordinary
fact question (whether the issuing bank observed standard practice) and, by
virtue of legislation, make it a matter of law for the court. Moreover, the official
comment makes clear that the drafters intended another question-what is
standard practice-also for the court. According to the official comment, the
court is expected both to "identify" and to determine as a matter of law the
* Adjunct Professor, Pace Law School and Seton Hall Law School; Of Counsel, Connell,
Foley & Geiser, Roseland, N.J. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of
Professors Eric Bergsten, Susan Block-Lieb, Andrea Catania, Neil Cohen, John Dolan, Howard
Erickson, Ed Hartnett, Donald Rapson, and Michael Zimmer, and the research of two students
at Pace Law School, Barbara Gonzalez and Allen LaRock.
1. The 1995 Official Text with Comments for Revised Article 5 of the Uniform
Commercial Code was released by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") on October 4, 1995.
2. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 1, para. 5 (revised 1995).
3. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (revised 1995) (emphasis added). The provision imposes a duty upon
issuers to observe standard banking practice. A breach of that duty could result in liability to
the beneficiary of the letter of credit, the applicant of the letter of credit (the issuer's customer),
or the confirming or negotiating bank.
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"nature and scope" of standard practice.4 Having the court rather than the jury
make these determinations is justified, in the drafters' view, as a means of
accomplishing their goals of consistency and efficiency, because "[g]ranting the
court authority to make these decisions will also encourage the salutary practice
of courts' granting summary judgment in circumstances where there are no
significant factual disputes."' "[S]peedier resolution of disputes" 6 will result if
material issues of fact can be eliminated by relabeling them issues of law, making
it easier for a court to grant summary judgment.
I. JURY TRIALS IN LETTER OF CREDIT CASES
While the parties in letter of credit cases frequently waive the right to a jury
trial,7 and while, increasingly, letter, of credit issues are decided on summary
judgment, thereby avoiding any trial, there has never been any serious question
that the right to ajury trial exists for letter of credit claims.8 The normal array of
post-trial motions and appeals relating to jury verdicts has been reviewed by
appellate courts without any question that jury trial rights exist in letter of credit
cases.9 The fundamental right to a jury trial has been consistently protected by
the U.S. Supreme Court, which has generally viewed any curtailment with
4. The official comment states:
Identifying and determining compliance with standard practice are matters of
interpretation for the court, not for the jury. As with similar rules in Sections 4A-
202(c) and 2-302, it is hoped that there will be more consistency in the outcomes
and speedier resolution of disputes if the responsibility for determining the nature
and scope of standard practice is granted to the court, not to a jury. Granting the
court authority to make these decisions will also encourage the salutary practice
of courts' granting summary judgment in circumstances where there are no
significant factual disputes.
U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 1, para. 5 (revised 1995).
5.Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Tosco Corp. v. FDIC, 723 F.2d 1242, 1244 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The parties
waived ajury trial and entered into lengthy stipulations."); Grouf v. State Nat'l Bank, 76 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1935) (Parties waived jury trial.).
8. See, for example, Lambom v. National Bank of Commerce, 276 U.S. 469 (1928), in
which Justice Brandeis discusses a letter of credit case "tried twice before a jury." Id. at 471.
9. See Murphy v. FDIC, 38 F.3d 1490 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding jury verdict in favor of
beneficiary, and requiring FDIC to pay letters of credit issued by failed bank); Schmueser v.
Burkburnett Bank, 937 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding jury verdict finding bank
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing); Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Nat'l Bank, 757 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1985) (upholding jury verdict and court's award of
actual and punitive damages); Savarin Corp. v. National Bank, 447 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1971)
(upholding jury verdict as to compensatory damages, reversing as to exemplary damages);
Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 296 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1961) (upholding jury
verdict in favor of bank on compliance issue); Caloric Stove Corp. v. Chemical Bank & Trust
Co., 205 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1953) (upholding jury verdict in favor of beneficiary); Second Nat'l
Bank v. Lash Corp., 299 F. 371 (3d Cir. 1924) (upholding jury verdict in favor of beneficiary);
Northwestern Bank v. NCF Fin. Corp., 365 S.E.2d 14, 20 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding
jury verdict in favor of bank beneficiary against finance company issuer).
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disfavor.10 State courts as well, have expressed strong support for the guarantee
of a civil jury trial." Thus, the assignment to a judge of questions that have
always been decided by the trier of fact, either the jury or the bench, indicates an
abrogation of rights which historically have been preserved by both state and
federal constitutional law. 2
II. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
The Seventh Amendment will only be implicated when a letter of credit issue
is tried in federal court. 3 Since the Seventh Amendment has never been applied
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 its
provisions are not applicable in state court proceedings. When a letter of credit
case is tried in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, however, a
plaintiff s right to a jury trial is determined as a matter of federal law under the
Seventh Amendment, even though the substantive law applicable to the case is
state law.' 5 Since letters of credit, by their very nature, involve parties which are
frequently dealing with one another across vast distances, a substantial portion
of letter of credit litigation in this country ends up in federal court by reason of
diversity. Thus, federal law should be examined to determine if application in
10. The Court has described the right to trial by jury as "a great constitutional right," and
stated that "it is only in exceptional cases and for specified causes that a party may be deprived
of it." Grand Chute v. Winegar, 82 U.S. 373, 375 (1872). More recently, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has stated that, "[t]he right of trial by jury in civil cases at common law is
fundamental to our history and jurisprudence." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
388 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
11. Looney v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 191 n.18 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating that
the right to ajury trial has always been regarded as sacred and has been jealously guarded by
courts); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1991) (stating that the
constitution forbids state from burdening, disturbing, or tampering with right to jury trial);
Williams v. Coppola, 549 A.2d 1092, 1093 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (stating that the right to
trial by jury in civil case is firmly enshrined in state constitution); Waggener v. Seever Sys.,
Inc., 664 P.2d 813, 817 (Kan. 1983) (stating that the right of trial by jury is a substantial and
valuable right and that the law favors trial by jury and the right should be carefully guarded
against infringement).
12. Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 753 (1943) ("The right ofjury trial in civil cases
at common law.., should be jealously guarded by the courts."); Lyon v. Mutual Benefit
Health & Accident Ass'n, 305 U.S. 484, 492 (1939) ("It is essential that the right of trial by
jury be scrupulously safeguarded .... "); Williams, 549 A.2d at 1093 (stating that the right to
trial by jury in a civil case is firmly enshrined in state constitution).
13. State constitutional rights may be implicated when the matter is litigated in state court,
however. See infra part III.
14. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) ("The Court has not held that the
right to jury trial in civil cases is an element of due process applicable to state courts through
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
15. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221,222 (1962) ("[The right to ajury trial in the federal
courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in diversity as well as other actions.");
Reiner v. New Jersey, 732 F. Supp. 530 (D.N.J. 1990) (stating that the plaintiff with a pendent
state claim is entitled to ajury trial because the right to ajury in federal court is determined by
federal law).
1997]
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federal court of revised section 5-108(e) would violate the Seventh Amendment.
The constitutional law of the states must also be examined to determine if those
state law guarantees to a civil jury trial are violated by revised section 5-108(e).
The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law."' 6 The thrust of the Amendment is to preserve the right
to ajury trial where the claim at issue corresponds to one triable by a jury under
English common law in 1791, when the Bill -of Rights was ratified. 7 At common
law, jury trials were provided for actions to ascertain legal rights, but not for
claims falling into the equity or admiralty jurisdiction of the courts. 8
It is well-settled, however, that the jury right reaches beyond common law
forms of action recognized in 1791.19 It also extends to statutory actions created
by Congress subsequent to 1791, if those actions are analogous to common law
actions in eighteenth-century law courts. As early as 1830, Justice Story stated:
By common law [the Framers of the Seventh Amendment] meant... not
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled
proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were
recognized, and equitable remedies were administered .... In ajust sense the
amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of
equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever might be the peculiar form which
they may assume to settle legal rights.2°
Thus, the Supreme Court noted in Curtis v. Loether that the applicability of the
Seventh Amendment to statute based rights was "a matter too obvious to be
doubted,"'" but if there had been any doubt prior to Curtis, it had now been
dispelled." The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory
rights, and requires ajury trial upon demand if the statute creates legal rights and
remedies enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law. 3
It is thus clear that Seventh Amendment protections can reach a claim for
money damages based not only on common law, but also on statutory law.
In Tull v. United States,24 the Supreme Court developed a two-pronged analysis
for deciding whether a particular case was within the ambit of the Seventh
Amendment. To determine whether an action is more similar to cases that were
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. A comprehensive history of the Seventh Amendment can be
found in Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV.
289 (1966) and Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment,
57 MINN. L. Rnv. 639 (1973).
17. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
18. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433 (1830).
19. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
20. Id. (citing Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447) (emphasis in Parsons, ellipsis in Curtis).
21. Id. at 193 (citing the court of appeals decision below, Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d "
1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 1972)).
22. Id. at 194.
23. Id.
24. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
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tried in courts of law than to suits tried in equity or admiralty, the Court must
first examine the nature of the action, and second, the remedy sought. The nature
of the action is determined by comparing it to eighteenth-century actions brought
in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.25 If
the action resembles a legal right brought in these early law courts, then the next
step is to examine the remedy plaintiff seeks, in order to determine whether the
remedy sought is legal or equitable in nature.26
With respect to both prongs of this inquiry, the letter of credit action is a legal
action par excellence for which a jury trial is guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment. It is for this reason, perhaps, that the right to a jury trial in a letter
of credit case has never been directly challenged. The use of letters of credit and
bills of exchange has been traced back to cuneiform tablets in Egypt, clay tablets
in Babylon, Phoenician merchants, and trade in ancient Greece.2 ' Along with
payment instruments and commercial usages constituting the law merchant,
letters of credit came to be governed by the common law in England. The basis
for treating letter of credit cases as involving common law legal rights had been
established by the end of the seventeenth century, when it became clear that the
earlier separation of the law merchant into its own merchant courts was ending,
and the two systems were inevitably drawing together.28 In the eighteenth
century, under two renowned common law judges, Lord Holt and Lord
Mansfield, the law merchant came to be integrated fully into the common law of
England.29 Thus, in 1791, when the Seventh Amendment was adopted in the
United States, "suits at common law" included claims with respect to mercantile
issues such as letters of credit growing out of the law merchant."
The second prong of the Supreme Court's analysis in Tull is whether the
remedy sought is one at law or one in equity. The Court noted that examining the
nature of the relief sought is even more important to determining a jury trial right
25. Id (citing, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 378 (1974); Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,477 (1962)).
26. Id. at 417-18 (citing, e.g., Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196; Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531
(1970)).
27. Rufus J. Trimble, The Law Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61 HARV. L. REv. 981,
984 (1948). For a discussion of early use of bills of exchange and letters of credit, see JOHN F.
DOLAN, LETrERs OF CREDIT 3.02 (rev. ed. 1996).
28. Miss L. Stuart Sutherland, The Law Merchant in England in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries, in 16 TRANsACTIONs OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 149, 173-74
(1934).
29. Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoffi The
Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. RnV. 351, 356 (1983). Compare
J.H. Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295
(1979), for a persuasively presented thesis that the law merchant differed from the common law
mainly from the perspective of procedure and proof, and that once the forms of action and
methods of proof became more flexible at common law, there was no further need for separate
merchant courts. Baker concludes that rather than any distinct corpus of law, the "law
merchant," at least by the seventeenth century, had become a figure of speech for that branch
of ordinary English law which happened to govern merchants' affairs.
30. Sutherland, supra note 28, at 173-76; see also Boris Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature of
the Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 395 (1965) (tracing letter of
credit practice from the twelfth century).
1997]
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than attempting to find an analogous common law cause of action, because
comparing 200 year old analogues with modem claims can often result in an
"abstruse historical" search.3'
Focusing on the nature of the remedy sought in letter of credit actions gives an
obvious result. Actions on letter of credit issues virtually always seek money
damages,32 and "[d]amages are and have always been a form of legal relief
available in a court of law."33 Thus, in a letter of credit case tried to a jury, if a
federal judge took upon himself to decide a material issue of fact with respect to
a legal claim,34 that would abridge a plaintiff s Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial on that issue.35 The Seventh Amendment mandates that "enjoyment of
the right of trial by jury not be obstructed, and that the ultimate determination of
issues of fact by the jury not be interfered with." '36 The Amendment's guarantee
to preserve the right of ajury trial "requires that questions of fact in common law
actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume directly or
indirectly to take from the jury or to itself such prerogative. 37
31. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) ("The second stage
[remedy stage] of this analysis is more important than the first [historical stage].") (citations
omitted); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 193, 196 (1964); Ross, 396 U.S. at 531.
32. The major exception is actions to enjoin payment of a letter of credit. Like any other
injunction action, these are actions in equity which are never decided by ajury.
33. Reiner v. New Jersey, 732 F. Supp. 530, 532-33 (D.N.J. 1990); see Curtis, 415 U.S.
at 196 ("More important, the relief sought here-actual and punitive damages-is the
traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.").
34. Even if a letter of credit case contains both legal and equitable claims, the right to ajury
trial is guaranteed for the legal claims. The Supreme Court made this clear in Curtis:
If the action is properly viewed as one for damages only, our conclusion that this
is a legal claim obviously requires a jury trial on demand. And if this legal claim
is joined with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on the legal claim,
including all issues common to both claims, remains intact. The right cannot be
abridged by characterizing the legal claim as "incidental" to the equitable relief
sought.
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-96 n.1 (citing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73
(1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)).
35. While it is clear that the right to ajury trial is available to parties in a letter of credit
case, before any matter can be tried to ajury, there must first be a material issue of fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The standards for granting summary judgment do not
differ depending on whether the action would be tried to ajury or tried to ajudge. Whether the
matter is by nature legal or equitable, the right to a trial, either jury or non-jury, only exists if
there are genuine issues of material fact to be decided. That question is generally decided on
motion to the court prior to trial. If the court decides that no genuine disputed questions of fact
exist, there is no right to a trial. If there is no right to a trial, a priori, there is no right to a trial
by jury.
In deciding a summary judgment motion, a judge's function is "not himself to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue
for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Thus, ajudge must make
the initial decision as a matter of law as to whether there is sufficient evidence of a material,
disputed fact to justify permitting the parties to proceed to trial. If not, she can decide the
motion, and the case, on the papers and oral argument.
36. Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920).
37. Walker v. New Mexico, 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
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III. THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
With regard to letter of credit litigation in state courts, an examination of the
law pertaining to jury trials in all fifty states is beyond the scope of this Article.
It is worth noting, however, that all states provide some form of right to a civil
jury trial.38 The only states which do not provide a constitutional right to a civil
jury trial are Louisiana39 and Colorado.40 Louisiana statutes do provide this
protection,4 ' with certain exceptions.42 Louisiana case law provides that the jury
trial right is fundamental, favored by law, and not to be denied in the absence of
specific authority for its denial.43 In Colorado, the right to a jury trial is regulated
by Rule 38 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the supreme
court under its constitutional rule making power.44
The earliest state constitutions, which predated the Federal Bill of Rights,
included provisions for civil jury trials.45 American colonists considered the right
to a jury to be a critical protection against the power of the judiciary. Reacting
to their experiences under autocratic British judges, the earliest Americans
insisted upon a civil jury trial right as a bulwark against tyranny and corruption.46
In most states today, the scope of the right to a civil jury trial parallels the
federal right guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. State courts generally
follow the federal approach of first determining whether a similar or analogous
issue was tried to a jury at common law at the time of adoption of the state
constitution, and of then determining if legal or equitable relief is sought.47
38. See J. KENDALL FEW, IN DEFENSE OF TRIAL BY JURY 469-76 (1993).
39. Duplantis v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 342 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (La. Ct.
App. 1977).
40. Kaitz v. District Court, 650 P.2d 553, 554 (Colo. 1982) ("In Colorado, there is no
constitutional right to a trial by jury in a civil action.") (citation omitted); Setchell v.
Dellacroce, 454 P.2d 804 (Colo. 1969) (noting that trial by jury in civil action not a matter of
constitutional right).
41. See LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 1731 (West 1990).
42. No suit against a state agency, for example, may be tried by ajury in Louisiana. See id.
art. 1732.
43. Duplantis, 342 So. 2d at 1143.
44. Setchell, 454 P.2d at 806. The right to ajury trial in a civil case in Colorado is derived
from the COLORADO RULES OF CIvIL PROCEDURE 38, which provides in pertinent part: "Upon
the filing of a demand, . . . including in actions for the recovery of specific real or personal
property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as due on contract, or as damages for
breach of contract, or for injuries to persons or property, all issues offact shall be tried by a
jury." COLO. R. Civ. P. 38 (emphasis added); see Kaitz, 650 P.2d at 554.
45. The first protection of civil juries is found in Section 29 of the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties, 1641. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 75
(1971). Civil juries were first constitutionally guaranteed in 1776 in Section 11 of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights. Id at 235.
46. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337-56 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
47. See Bruce D. Greenberg & Gary K. Wolinetz, The Right to a Civil Jury Trial in New
Jersey, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1461 n.224 (1995).
1997)
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A minority of states have maintained a distinction between law and chancery
courts, and that structural difference has created some minor differences in the
law governing a jury trial right.48 As an example, in the 1947 Constitution of the
State of New Jersey, separate courts of law and chancery merged into two
divisions of the superior court. Despite concurrent jurisdiction to provide both
legal and equitable relief, the two divisions continue to hear different cases based
on the historic separation of law and equity.49 There are virtually no jury trials
in the Chancery Division."0
Drawing the distinction among cases to be heard by the two different types of
courts has produced some rules that differ from the mainstream. In a case where
legal and equitable issues arise out of the same controversy, if the overall nature
of the action is equitable, none of the claims will be tried to a jury."' If an
independent legal claim is tried with an equitable claim, it may be tried to a jury,
but only after the equitable claims have been resolved.52
While some variations obviously exist between state and federal practice as
well as among the various states with respect to jury trials, 3 the fact remains that
the jury trial right has constitutional protection in almost all states. The right to
a jury trial in a letter of credit case, which is clearly guaranteed in federal court,
is also protected in all states. The minor variation in state practices does not
significantly affect the basic right to a jury in a letter of credit case. Thus, the
48. See, e.g., Colclasure v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 720 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Ark. 1986);
Miller v. District Court, 388 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1964); Hiatt v. Yergin, 284 N.E.2d 834, 841-50
(Ind. Ct. App. 1972), overruled on other grounds, Erdman v. White, 411 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 602 P.2d 1299, 1302-03 (Kan. 1979); First Nat'l Bank
v. Middleton, 480 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (Miss. 1985); Linville v. Wilson, 628 S.W.2d 422, 425
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
49. This separation has been enforced by rules promulgated by the New Jersey Supreme
Court. See N.J. CT. R. 1:6-4 (filing rules in Chancery and in Law); N.J. CT. R. 1:6-5(b)
(procedures for filing briefs in Chancery and in Law); N.J. CT. R. 4:3-1 (describing. Chancery
Division and Law Division and motions to transfer from one to the other); N.J. CT. R. 4:25-1
(pretrial conferences mandatory in Chancery, discretionary in Law); see also Greenberg &
Wolinetz, supra note 47, at 1466-69.
50. Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 47, at 1468.
51. Steiner v. Stein, 66 A.2d 719 (1949); see Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 47, at
1489. In contrast, in federal court, legal issues intertwined with equitable issues will
nonetheless be tried to a jury. See supra note 34.
52. Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 47, at 1479. This differs from federal court practice,
where legal claims are almost inevitably tried first. In Beacon Theatres, the Supreme Court
stated as follows:
[T]he trial court will necessarily have to use its discretion in deciding whether the
legal or equitable cause should be tried first. Since the right to jury trial is a
constitutional one, however, while no similar requirement protects trials by the
court, that discretion is very narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be
exercised to preserve jury trial.
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959) (citation omitted).
53. New Jersey has determined that jury trials are not available under New Jersey antitrust
laws. Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 47, at 1488; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:9-1 to 9-18
(West 1989). On the other hand, New Jersey has refused to adopt a "complexity exception" to
a jury trial right. Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 47, at 1498.
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analysis of whether revised section 5-108(e) unconstitutionally restricts the right
to a jury trial will not differ with respect to federal or state court, except as to
Louisiana, where the right is based on statute and common law, and Colorado,
where the right is regulated by the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. 4
IV. APPLYING THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT IN LETTER OF
CREDIT CASES
Historically, letter of credit cases have almost always been actions at law rather
than equity.55 Those letter of credit cases which seek money damages and which
involve material questions of fact give rise to a right in the parties to trial by jury.
It is in this context that revised section 5-108(e) should be examined to determine
whether, by abridging jury trial rights, the provision, either by its terms, or as
interpreted in the official comment, 6 violates state and federal constitutional law.
The critical sentence in revised section 5-108(e) states, "Determination of the
issuer's observance of the standard practice is a matter of interpretation for the
court."57 There are, in fact, three separate questions raised by this sentence, each
of which must be analyzed in accordance with historical and jurisprudential
precedent. First, is it the function of the court or the jury to determine what is
standard practice? Second, is it the function of the court or the jury to
characterize the bank's conduct? Third, is it the function of the court or the jury
to determine if the bank's conduct complied with standard practice? Based on the
language of revised section 5-108(e), and the official comment, the answer to
these three questions would appear to be that all three functions always belong
to the court, and never to the jury. An analysis based on the constitutional jury
right, however, suggests that the answer to each of these questions is much more
complex: the same question may sometimes be a matter for the court, and at other
times will involve a material question of fact for the jury. What makes revised
section 5-108(e) unconstitutional is that it takes away from the trial judge his
constitutionally based obligation to determine whether a particular issue is a
disputed fact question for the jury.
54. See supra notes 41, 44.
55. The exception is when an applicant seeks to enjoin payment under the letter of credit.
See supra note 32.
56. Official comments to U.C.C. provisions are, of course, not law. They serve at best as
a kind of super legislative history. See Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting
Commercial Law for the New Millennium: Will the Current Process Suffice?, 26 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 551, 556 (1993). Nonetheless, courts tend to give the official comments deference, and
often afford them great weight It is important to remember, however, that while legislatures
enact the text of the U.C.C. into law, they do not enact the official comments. See Laurens
Walker, Writings on the Margin of American Law: Committee Notes, Comments, and
Commentary, 29 GA. L. REV. 993, 1013 (1995).
57. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (revised 1995).
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A. Determining What Is Standard Practice
Article 5 in its revised form sets the standard that issuers of letters of credit
must follow in determining whether to honor a letter of credit. Revised section
5-108(e) requires issuers to "observe standard practice of financial institutions
that regularly issue letters of credit." 8 The statutory language itself does not
clearly state whether, in a litigated matter, it is a court or jury function to define
standard practice. It is clear from the official comment, however, that the drafters
intended this determination to be made by the court. This comment states as
follows:
Identifying and determining compliance with standard practice are matters
of interpretation for the court, not for the jury.... [I]t is hoped that there will
be more consistency in the outcomes and speedier resolution of disputes if the
responsibility for determining the nature and scope of standard practice is
granted to the court, not to a jury.5 9
Thus, according to the official comment, the court is expected both to identify
standard practice and to determine its nature and scope.' This is at odds with the
general rule already established in the U.C.C. as to the proper function of the
judge and the jury. In the rules of general application in Article 1, subsection 1-
205(2) declares that the jury determines the nature and scope of a trade usage or
practice.6
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that
it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence
and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that
such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the
interpretation of the writing is for the court.2
Since subsection 1-205(2) clearly provides that the existence and scope of a
trade usage are issues to be proved as facts, the sentence from the official
comment to revised section 5-108(e) asserting to the contrary that it is for the
court to identify and determine the nature and scope of standard letter of credit
practice directly conflicts with subsection 1-205(2). Which should a court heed?
While the "General Provisions" of Article 1 apply as a general rule to the other
articles of the U.C.C., they may be superseded by specific provisions of another
58. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (revised 1995).
59. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 1, para. 5 (revised 1995) (emphasis added).
60. Although official comments tend to be given great weight by the courts, not all
commentators believe they should be entitled to deference. Professor Walker asserts that courts
should give little, if any, weight to such marginal writings, because they are so vulnerable to
pressure from special interests. See Walker, supra note 56, at 1032. But see Donald J. Rapson,
Deficiencies and Ambiguities in Lessors' Remedies Under Article 2A: Using Official
Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute, 39 ALA. L. REv. 875 (1988), for a discussion of the
useful role of official comments to U.C.C. Article 2A.
61. The drafters properly considered standard practice to be a usage of trade, and noted that
a practice may be overridden by agreement or course of dealing, citing U.C.C. § 1-205(4).
U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 8 (revised 1995).
62. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1996) (emphasis added).
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article. They are generally not, however, superseded by official comments to
another article, since official comments are not law.63 Thus, it would appear that
revised section 5-108(e) should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with
subsection 1-205(2), rather than consistent with the official comment.
Assuming, however, that the black letter law of revised section 5-108(e) is read
as requiring the court to determine standard practice, the question then is whether
the requirements of section 1-205(2) that the existence and scope of usage are to
be proved as facts are constitutionally mandated, or whether these requirements
can be trumped by Article 5. Is it constitutionally required that the determination
of some forms of standard practice must be put before the trier of fact?' It
appears that there are at least some occasions when determining standard practice
should, as a constitutional matter, be a question for the jury. To understand when
a constitutional requirement may surface, it is necessary to understand (1) what
is generally meant by "question of law" and "question of fact," (2) what is meant
by "standard' practice" in the letter of credit context, (3) how a written trade
usage incorporated into a trade code is properly interpreted, and (4) how a trade
usage not incorporated in a trade code or not in writing is properly interpreted.
1. Questions of Fact and Questions of Law
The various denominations of matters as "questions of law" and "questions of
fact" are not always clear or consistent. One commentator has noted, "[B]y and
large the terms 'law' and 'fact' are merely short terms for the respective
functions of judge and jury." '65 In other words, to some extent, whatever is
decided by the judge in a jury trial is denominated a question of law, and
whatever is decided by the jury is denominated a question of fact. In some cases,
tradition has assigned issues to judge or to jury not based on actual "law" or
"fact." Judges at English common law, for example, were expected to interpret
written documents as a matter of law.66 Where such interpretation involves
ascertaining the parties' intent, however, this determination is actually a question
63. See supra notes 56, 60.
64. Subsection 1-205(2) also provides that, "[i]f it is established that such a usage is
embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the
court." U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1996). As will be discussed infra part IV.A.2., however, letter of
credit practice is not uniformly contained in any written code. The judge's role in interpreting
"the writing" will be discussed infra part IV.A.3.
65. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 279 (1930); see also 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 554 (1960).
66. Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 43, 75-76 (1980).
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of fact.67 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, this responsibility
was given to judges because at that time, English juries were largely illiterate.68
There are, however, generally accepted views as to the difference between
questions of law and questions of fact. A question of law involves principles
potentially applicable to many civil cases.69 It is capable of being predicated in
advance, and awaits proof of the facts necessary for its application."° Questions
of law tend to be "fact-free general principles that are applicable to all, or at least
to many disputes, and not simply to the one subjudice."' In sum, a question of
law for the court is a general proposition, while a question of fact for the jury is
a case-specific inquiry.72
2. Standard Practice
In considering whether standard practice should be determined as a matter of
fact or a matter of law, it is important to consider its meaning within the letter of
credit context. Revised section 5-108(e) appears to be primarily, but not
exclusively, applicable to issues of documentary compliance. The section is
entitled "Issuer's Rights and Obligations," and deals with the issuer's rights and
responsibilities once documents have been presented under a letter of credit. In
section 5-108(i), however, the code also deals with the issuer's reimbursement
rights, its right to take documents free of claims of the beneficiary or presenter,
its preclusion from asserting a right of recourse on a draft under sections 3-414
and 4-415, and its preclusion from restitution of money paid by mistake. The
broad statement in revised section 5-108(e)----"An issuer shall observe standard
practice of financial institutions that regularly issue letters of credit"-does not
67. An inquiry into the parties' states of mind at a particular point of time is obviously
factual. A minority of courts have adopted this view in deciding that the jury should interpret
certain contracts where the parties' intent is at issue. In Arledge v. GulfOil Corp., 571 F.2d
1388, 1389 (5th Cir. 1978), the court vacated ajudgment and remanded for a new trial because
the judge rather than the jury had interpreted the contract. "mhe question of contract
interpretation is one for the jury in ajury-tried case." Id. See Gillespie v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
486 F.2d 281, 283 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The interpretation of the meaning of words used in a
contract is normally ... decided by the trier of fact rather than the court."). In Dobson v.
Masonite Corp., 359 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1966), the court found that the jury should
determine the meaning of the contract even though there was no dispute regarding its existence
or its terms. It further noted, "[i]n drawing the ultimate conclusion as to the meaning of the
parties, we believe the jury was fulfilling its traditional function as the finder of the facts." Id
68. Devlin, supra note 66, at 75; see also Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the
Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1867, 1932 (1966).
69. Weiner, supra note 68, at 1869.
70. Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112
(1923-24).
71. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision MakingAuthority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and
Procedural Discretion, 64N.C. L. REV. 993, 994 n.3 (1986) (citation omitted). Louis observes
that the "classification of ultimate facts as question§of law amounts to a manipulation of the
law-fact doctrine to take questions from the jury." Id. at 1028.
72. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman,
J., dissenting), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
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appear to be limited to documentary compliance issues and those set forth in
section 5-108(i). Rather, the standard also appears to apply with respect to the
way an issuer would, for example, deal with issues of transfer, assignment,
waiver, or reimbursement of a paying bank. It would make no sense for an issuer
to have to observe the standard practice of financial institutions that regularly
issue letters of credit with respect to documentary compliance issues, and not
have to observe that same standard with respect to transfers of letters of credit
or other letter of credit issues which affect issuer liability.
Official comment 8 to revised section 5-108(e), which defines standard
practice with respect to letters of credit, does not in any way suggest that
standard practice is limited to the standard practice with respect to documentary
compliance:
The standard practice referred to in subsection (e) includes (i) international
practice set forth in or referenced by the Uniform Customs and Practice, (ii)
other practice rules published by associations of financial institutions, and
(iii) local and regional practice. It is possible that standard practice will vary
from one place to another. Where there are conflicting practices, the parties
should indicate which practice governs their rights. A practice may be
overridden by agreement or course of dealing. See Section 1-205(4).' 3
This broad definition of "standard practice," which appears to refer to
whatever practices an issuer engages in with respect to letters of credit, is also
striking for its observation that letter of credit practice is not standard. As noted
above, it may vary from place to place, and there may be conflicting practices.
The practice may be written or oral. There has been considerable effort in recent
years to try to compile a written record of various banking practices in different
regions and in different countries.7' Such a record could provide some evidence
that a standard practice existed with respect to a particular issue. What is
important to note, however, is that since a "standard practice" can be a peculiar
local or regional practice, the determination of its existence and scope will not
necessarily involve broad principles applicable to many different matters. It may
frequently require a case-specific, factual inquiry.
While subsection 1-205(2) makes clear that the existence and scope of a trade
usage are to be proved as facts, it also provides that "[i]f it is established that
such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the
interpretation of the writing is for the court."7" The Uniform Customs and
Practices for Documentary Credits ("UCP"), undoubtedly qualifies as such a
trade code.76 It is a codification of banking practices with respect to letters of
credit. By their terms, most letters of credit are subject to the UCP. While the
UCP contains some standard banking practices, it clearly does not contain all of
73. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 8 (revised 1995).
74. See A Conversation with Kozolchyk re UCP Article 13(a) & the ICC's National
Banking Practices Initiative, LE=rER OF CREDIT UPDATE (Government Information Services),
Nov. 1995, at 32 (discussing efforts of the USCIB to compile standard practices among banks
in the United States., Mexico, and Canada).
75. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1996).
76. See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UCP 500: ICC UNIFORM
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993).
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them.77 The general rule, therefore, would be that for standard practices which
are embodied in the UCP, the interpretation of such practices would be for the
court. There are, of course, exceptions to and variations upon this general rule,
and they will be discussed below.
3. Interpreting the Writing
What does it mean for the court to "interpret the writing," when the standard
practice at issue is in the UCP? Today, a generally accepted doctrine is that
construction or interpretation of the provisions of a written document is a matter
of law for the judge, unless extrinsic evidence is needed. 7' The United States
Supreme Court has described this doctrine as follows:
When the words of a written instrument are used in their ordinary meaning,
their construction presents a question solely of law. But words are used
sometimes in a peculiar meaning. Then extrinsic evidence may be necessary
to determine the meaning of words appearing in the document. This is true
where technical words or phrases not commonly understood are employed,
or extrinsic evidence may be necessary to establish a usage of trade or locality
which attaches provisions not expressed in the language of the instrument.
Where such a situation arises, and the peculiar meaning of words, or the
existence of a usage, is proved by evidence, the function of construction is
necessarily preceded by the determination of the matter of fact. Where the
controversy over the writing arises in a case which is being tried before a
jury, the decision of the question of fact is left to the jury, with instructions
from the court as to how the document shall be construed, if the jury finds
that the alleged peculiar meaning or usage is established. 9
The Court makes clear that when a written document is interpreted by a court,
and extrinsic evidence is needed to understand trade usage pertinent to that
interpretation, any disputed factual issue must be determined by the jury. The
court then gives any necessary instructions to the jury so that it can properly
apply the law to the facts to construe the written document.
While "construction" and "interpretation" have sometimes been loosely used
as interchangeable terms, a distinction between the concepts has been
recognized. "Construction" of a written instrument generally means determining
its legal effect, while "interpretation" generally means ascertaining the meaning
of the Words used."0 In almost all situations, however, courts have held that the
77. See U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 8 (revised 1995); infra note 132.
78. CORBIN, supra note 65, § 554; 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 616
(Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961). But cf supra note 67 (describing Fifth and Ninth Circuit
views of contract construction as a matter of fact for the jury).
79. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291-92 (1922) (citations
omitted).
80. See, e.g., Homick v. Owners Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 370, 371 (Iowa 1993)
("Construction of an insurance policy-the process of determining its legal effect-is a
question of law for the court. Interpretation--the process of determining the meaning of words
used-is also a question of law for the court unless it depends on extrinsic evidence or a choice
among reasonable inferences to be drawn.") (citing A.Y. McDonald Indus. v. INA, 475 N.W.2d
607, 618 (Iowa 1991)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 cmt. c (1979).
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determination of the underlying facts necessary to permit construction or
interpretation, if disputed, are matters for the jury."'
a. The Markman Exception
The only situation in which underlying disputed facts are considered to be a
matter exclusively for the court is in the construction of a patent claim. In
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 82 the U.S. Supreme Court found no clear
authority under the "historical test" (i.e., what the practice was in England in
1791) for jury interpretation of disputed terms of art with respect to a patent
claim.83 The Court noted that "prior to 1790 nothing in the nature of a claim had
appeared in either British patent practice or in that of the American states."'" The
closest eighteenth-century analogue of a modem claim, according to the Court,
was the specification, that is, a description of the invention "'in such full, clear,
concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art ... to make and
use the same."'8 5 The Court found as to the specification, however, that "the
mere smattering of patent cases that we have from this period shows no
established jury practice sufficient to support an argument by analogy that
today's construction of a claim should be a guaranteed jury issue. ' 86
Having found no authoritative support for a jury trial on the issue of disputed
terms in a claim construction in 1791, the Court then looked to precedent.
Finding "no clear answers" with respect to patent cases, it then turned to
81. Keyser v. Kemper, 146 A. 275, 277 (Md. 1929):
It is true that ordinarily the interpretation or construction of a written instrument
is for the court; but when the written instrument on its face is so ambiguous as to
necessitate the production of evidence outside of the instrument in order to
determine the true intention and real contract between the parties, and where this
evidence is conflicting, it presents a mixed question of law and fact, and should
be submitted to the jury for their determination, under proper instructions from
the court.
Id.; Canadian Nat. Ry. Co. v. George M. Jones Co., 27 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1928)
("Although the construction of written instruments is one for the court, where the case turns
upon the proper conclusions to be drawn from a series of letters, particularly of a commercial
character, taken in connection with other facts and circumstances, it is one which is properly
referred to ajury.") (quoting Rankin v. Fidelity Ins. Trust Co., 189 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1903)).
82. 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996) (holding that "the construction of a patent, including
terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court").
83. The Court noted that the word "claim" has a peculiar meaning in patent law which,
"particularly poin[ts] out and distinctly clai[ms] the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention." Id at 1388 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112). "A claim covers and secures a process,
a machine, a manufacture, a composition of matter, or a design, but never the function or result
of either, nor the scientific explanation of their operation." Id (quoting 6 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE
LIPSCOMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS 315-16 (3d ed. 1987).
84. Id at 1390 (citing Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. Soc.
134 (1938)). The Court also noted that claim practice did not achieve statutory recognition
until the passage of the Act of 1836, and inclusion of a claim did not become a statutory
requirement until 1870. Id. (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 1391, 1387-88 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (omission in original)).
86. Id. at 1391.
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"functional considerations.""7 The Court cited its earlier decision in Miller v.
Fenton,8 that when an issue "falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard
and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a
determination that, as a matter of the sound administration ofjustice, one judicial
actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question." 9 The
Court then determined that "judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the
acquired meaning of patent terms."90
In reaching this conclusion, the Court weighed heavily the specialized training
needed and the highly technical nature of the patent, including the "special
doctrines relating to the proper form and scope of claims that have been
developed by the courts and the Patent Office." '91 A critical consideration was the
judge's trained ability to evaluate testimony in relation to the overall structure
of the patent, and to ascertain whether an expert's proposed definition fully
comported with the specification and claims so as to preserve the patent's
internal coherence.
92
Finally, the Court considered "uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as
an independent reason to allocate all issues of construction to the court." 93 It was
highly significant to the Court that the limits of a patent must be known "for the
protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of others
and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the
public."94 Otherwise, "[t]he public [would] be deprived of rights supposed to
belong to it, without being clearly told what it is that limits these rights."95 The
Court noted that the desire for this kind of uniformity related to the construction
of patents was a motivation for Congress to create the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for patent cases.96
In affirming the Federal Circuit's en banc decision that construction of patent
claims was a matter exclusively for the court,97 the Supreme Court made quite
clear that its decision was limited to the unique field of patents, and that part of
its reasoning was based upon the unique role of the specialized appellate court
set up to deal with them. The Court very specifically noted that it was not
deciding any broad principle of construction of written documents outside of the
87. Id. at 1395.
88. 474 U.S. 104,114 (1985).
89. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent
Claims, 46 MICH. L. REv. 755, 765 (1948)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1396.
94. Id. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938)).
95. Id. at 1393 n.9 (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877)).
96. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981)).
97. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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patent area.98 It appears, therefore, that Markman is an exception to the normal
construction of written documents, limited to patents.99
While some might try to argue for a more general application of Markman, it
would be difficult to find a situation which had very many similarities to the
patent field. Patent law is exclusively federal law, created pursuant to the U.S.
Constitution's grant of power to Congress "[tio promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 0 Lawyers who
practice in the field need to pass a separate, intensive bar examination to
establish they-have the expertise and competence to practice patent law. No other
field has both a separate bar examination and a separate appellate court to deal
with its complexities.
One of the reasons it is unlikely that the principles of Markman would be
applied outside of the patent area is that the rationales simply would not work.
With patent law, the Court's interpretation of the Seventh Amendment will apply
uniformly to patent cases because patent law is strictly a federal issue. With
respect to the jury trial right in other areas, however, whether a judge or jury will
decide a particular issue may depend on the date of adoption of the governing
state constitution, and could therefore produce a result different from a result
based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Seventh Amendment.
The historical test with respect to the Seventh Amendment examines the state
of common law in England in 1791. Many state constitutions were adopted much
later. They generally look to the common law that was in effect at the time of
adoption of their state constitution. In California, for example, the right of trial
by jury is the right as it existed at common law at the time the California
Constitution of 1849 was adopted.' The California courts, in determining
whether a jury trial right exists as to a particular matter, must "ascertain what
was the rule of the English common law upon this subject in 1850." 102 In New
Jersey, the Supreme Court has permitted reliance on the right to a jury trial as it
existed in 1947, when the most recent New Jersey Constitution was adopted."0 3
98. "We need not in any event consider here whether our conclusion that the Seventh
Amendment does not require terms of art in patent claims to be submitted to the jury supports
a similar result in other types of cases." Marlanan, 116 S. Ct. at 1393 n.9. The Court also noted
in the next footnote, in rather convoluted language, that it was also not deciding "the extent to
which the Seventh Amendment can be said to have crystallized a law/fact distinction or
whether post-1791 precedent classifying an issue as one of fact would trigger the protections
of the Seventh Amendment if (unlike this case) there were no more specific reason for
decision." Id. at 1393 n.10 (citation omitted). The specific reasons the Court gave for its
decision were the need for uniform interpretation of a given patent, and the need for specially
trained judges to construe highly technical patent claims. Id. at 1395, 1396.
99. See Editorial, 144 N.J. L.J. 558 (1996) ("Patent law is exclusively under federal control,
so that Marlnan will have limited effect.").
100. U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
101. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 231 P.2d 832, 835 (Cal. 1951).
102. Id.
103. In re LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268, 1273 (N.J. 1981) (Article 1, paragraph 9 of the New
Jersey Constitution of 1947 "guarantees a jury trial only to the extent the right existed at the
time of the adoption of the 1947 Constitution.").
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Quite obviously, the right to a jury trial, at least as to certain particulars, may
differ in 1791, 1850, and 1947. No justification based on increasing
"uniformity"'" can be made for taking a fact issue from the jury when
constitutionally mandated treatment of that right in state and federal court can
never be uniform, since the constitutional underpinnings of the right are not
uniform. Thus, broadening the application of Markman by applying it outside of
the patent area to take an issue away from the jury could not increase
"uniformity,"'' 5 since many state constitutions will still mandate that all factual
disputes, particularly those involving underlying extrinsic evidence, should go
to the jury.
Moreover, the Court was particularly concerned that a "given" patent receive
uniform treatment. A patent could be infringed several times by different parties.
It must be construed uniformly, to avoid a "zone of uncertainty" which would
discourage invention." 6 A letter of credit, on the other hand, would probably
need construction only once, since generally it would deal with only one
transaction, or at most, with a series of transactions between the same parties.
Thus, uniformity of treatment of a given letter of credit could not justify taking
a fact question from the jury.
The Court also used a "functional" analysis' 7 to determine that in the highly
technical and specialized area of patents, judges are better suited than juries to
find the acquired meaning of patent terms.'08 According to the Court, judges, by
having "a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall
structure of the patent," are in a "better position to ascertain whether an expert's
proposed definition fully comports with the specification and claims and so will
preserve the patent's internal coherence."'1
0 9
104. Whether in fact judges render more uniform decisions than juries in any particular area
does not appear to have been the basis of any significant empirical study, and may simply
reflect a belief held by some, or may indicate a bias against juries.
105. It is problematic in any event whether judges render "uniform" decisions. See infra
notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
106. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1396 (1996).
107. The Court refers to a "functional consideration" as the basis to be used for deciding,
when it is not clear whether a particular issue is law or fact, and therefore whether it should be
determined by judge or jury, which is the sounder means of administering justice. Id at 1395.
108. Id. This view was severely criticized in an editorial in the New Jersey Law Journal,
which stated:
Heretofore, appointment as a federal judge represented an acknowledgement
of one's legal acumen (among other, possibly more desirable, attributes). The
U.S. Supreme Court has now declared, in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., [116 S.Ct. 1389 (1996)] that elevation to the federal bench constitutes
recognition of the appointee's scientific, technical and engineering expertise as
well....
What makes judges, in the mind of the Supreme Court, "better suited to find
the acquired meaning of patent terms?'! Did judges, unlike most mortals who
comprise the jury pool, continue their scientific studies beyond high school? Did
they sign up for an array of engineering courses in law school?
Editorial, supra note 99.
109. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
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The Court's reasoning is specifically oriented to the patent area, and unlikely
to be applied elsewhere. Particularly with respect to letters of credit, it is not
necessary for a judge to have highly technical specialized training to determine
underlying factual issues. 10 The factual issues in letters of credit, when they
exist, tend to be straightforward. One of the reasons banks have insisted upon
"strict compliance"-that is, the rule that the beneficiary must present documents
which comply strictly with the requirements of the letter of credit-is so the
employees who check documents do not have to make complicated or ministerial
decisions. Banks stress that they can keep costs down by having a bright-line rule
on strict compliance so that clerical-level employees can function as document
checkers. These employees simply compare the documents with the letter of
credit: if the documents match the description, the bank pays under the letter of
credit; if there is no match, the bank is not obligated to pay."' While in the
imperfect world of commerce, different kinds of issues can and do arise, the facts
underlying letter of credit cases do not even approach the level of complexity of
the average patent. There is no published case where a judge has declared that
the factual issues presented by a letter of credit case were too complex for a jury.
Nor is this author aware of any commentator having identified a specific letter
of credit case as containing facts too complicated to be fairly decided by a jury.
There is no study showing that juries do not perform their task adequately in
letter of credit cases. There is no indication that jury verdicts in letter of credit
cases are disproportionately set aside, or that their verdicts are in any way
inferior to or more inconsistent than decisions made by judges. In short, there is
no reason to restrict jury trials in letter of credit cases. Certainly an expansion of
the Markman rationale, on the bases of "uniformity" and "specialized training
of judges" would not be justified in the letter of credit area.
b. Precedent in Letter of Credit Cases for
Construing Written Instruments
Revised section 5-108(e) requires an issuer to "observe the standard practice
of financial institutions that regularly issue letters of credit." If the "standard
practice" is set forth in the UCP, it may be necessary to interpret the meaning of
the particular UCP provision. In interpreting the UCP, the court is not
interpreting law, but rather a codification of custom and usage."' A judge's
110. A trier of fact may need additional information on industry practices to understand what
the pertinent customs and practices are, but does not need specialized training to understand
or apply the information which can be provided by those knowledgeable in the actual practices.
111. See Laudisi v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 146 N.E. 347, 350 (N.Y. 1924); Gerald T.
McLaughlin & Neil B. Cohen, The Independence Principle, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1992, at 3.
112. In Sempione v. Provident Bank, 75 F.3d 951,954 (4th Cir. 1996), the Fourth Circuit
stated:
The UCP is not law. Nor does it have the force of law. As its name implies, the
UCP is a code or compilation of the usage of trade pertaining to letters of credit.
It stands "as a record of normal expectations." Its use and interpretation are
governed by [U.C.C. §] 1-205(2), which provides: "The existence and scope of
[the] usage [of trade] are to be proved as facts." If the usage is "embodied in a
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interpretation of a trade usage, however, should be closely linked to the actual
practice in the industry in question-here, the banking community."3 There may
frequently be, therefore, the need for extrinsic evidence to explain the practice." 4
The drafters clearly anticipated such a situation in the third and final sentence to
revised section 5-108(e): "The court shall offer the parties a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence of the standard practice." When the court is
"interpreting the meaning" of a written document such as the UCP, and needs
extrinsic evidence to understand a particular practice in its commercial context,
the question then becomes whether this extrinsic evidence will be presented to
the court as a matter of law, or to the jury as a matter of fact."'
The general rule with respect to the interpretation of written documents is that
when extrinsic evidence is necessary, it presents a question of fact for the jury
if it raises a material, disputed fact." 6 According to courts and commentators,
interpretation of written documents is for the court only (1) when the terms are
so clear that only one reasonable interpretation is available, or (2) when the terms
are subject to either of two reasonable interpretations but no extrinsic evidence
is presented." 7 There is, of course, another situation where extrinsic evidence
may be presented, and yet not require a jury to interpret the meaning. That may
occur when the extrinsic evidence is unambiguous and raises no disputed fact
written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the
court."
Id. (quoting HENRY HARTFIELD, LETTERS OF CREDIT 3-4 (1979)).
113. Id. at 955 ("[T]he meaning of the UCP and the usage of the trade can be proved by any
person qualified to address the subject, including an expert witness."); see also id. at 960 ("In
interpreting the UCP, courts must strive to ascertain the actual banking practice that the
Customs embody.").
114. An editorial comment in LETTER OF CREDIT UPDATE, Feb. 1996, at 6, puts it more
strongly: "It is not to be expected that a judge will be able to interpret standard banking
practice embodied in the UCP or other rules without expert assistance."
115. Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1942), observed that
a controlling distinction between law and fact is whether evidence is needed, for a question of
fact usually calls for proof, whereas matters of law are established not by evidentiary showing
but by intellectual abstraction.
116. Sempione, 75 F.3d at 959; World-Wide Rights Partnership v. Combe, Inc., 955 F.2d
242, 245 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Taylor, 293 F.2d 717, 722 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding
that since extrinsic evidence is necessary but not harmonious, it was error not to leave
interpretation to jury.); Floyd v. Ring Constr. Corp., 165 F.2d 125, 129 (8th Cir. 1948);
Western Petroleum Co. v. Tidal Gasoline Co., 284 F. 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1922); Deerhurst Estates
v. Meadow Homes, Inc., 165 A.2d 543, 553 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1960) ("While the
construction of the terms of a contract may be a question for the court to decide, where the
meaning is unclear and depends upon disputed extraneous testimony, interpretation should be
left to the determination of the finder of fact.") (citations omitted); Broadway Maintenance
Corp. v. City of New York, 241 N.Y.S.2d 116, 119 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (holding that since
interpretation required the weighing of extrinsic evidence, it was improper to grant summary
judgment.); Calderoni v. Berger, 50 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1947).
117. CORBIN, supra note 65, § 554; WILLISTON, supra note 78, § 616; see also Parsons v.
Bristol Dev. Co., 402 P.2d 839, 842 (Cal. 1965) (Traynor, C.J.) ("It is ... solely a judicial
function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of
extrinsic evidence.").
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issues."' Where no extrinsic evidence is presented, or where it is presented but
raises no disputed material issue of fact, partial summary judgment or summary
judgment may be appropriate." 9
The Fourth Circuit recently considered extrinsic evidence in a letter of credit
case. In Sempione v. Provident Bank,2 ° Rock Solid Investments, Inc. ("RSI"),
had obtained a standby letter of credit from Provident Bank of Maryland to
secure a loan from Suriel Finance, N.V. ("Suriel"). The letter of credit, in the
amount of $750,000, was to provide security for annual interest payments on the
loan, and was to be automatically renewable for seven years. Manufacturer's
Hanover Trust Company confirmed the letter of credit for one year. The
beneficiary, Suriel, borrowed from Banca del Sempione the funds it needed to
lend to RSI. Suriel transferred to Banca del Sempione its rights as beneficiary.
The letter of credit stated that it was for $750,000 "to be automatically renewed
annually" for seven years.
Banca del Sempione sought, and believed it had received, clarification from
Provident through Suriel that the renewal was unconditionally automatic and did
not depend upon recollateralization of amounts drawn down or upon any other
condition. This clarification came in a series of letters from an officer of
Provident Bank, Samuel Henry. When RSI could not meet its interest payments,
the letter of credit was drawn upon in several drafts. The last draft, which would
have exceeded $750,000, was refused by Manufacturer's at Provident's
direction.' 2 '
On Banca del Sempione's claims for wrongful dishonor, breach, and
anticipatory breach, the lower court granted summary judgment for Provident,
holding that Banca del Sempione lacked standing because the transfer did not
transfer all rights under the letter of credit, but only the right to draw up to
$750,000." The district court also found that Henry's letters did not constitute
118. Hickey v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 995 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993); World-Wide Rights,
955 F.2d at 245; Jaftex Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 617 F.2d 1062, 1063 (4th Cir. 1980).
119. Even if the judge considers a written instrument to be "plain and unambiguous on its
face," extrinsic evidence may be admissible when it is relevant to prove a meaning to which
the language of the instrument is susceptible. CORBIN, supra note 65, § 555, at 232-33 ("It is
not necessary that words should be unusual words or words that are 'ambiguous on their face'
in order to admit evidence of special usage."); see also World-Wide Rights, 955 F.2d at 245 ("If
resort to extrinsic evidence leaves genuine issues of fact respecting a written document's proper
interpretation, then the interpretation must be left to the trier of fact."); Board of Trade v. Swiss
Credit Bank, 597 F.2d 146, 149 (9th Cir. 1979) (reversing summary judgment because of
triable issue of fact as to meaning intended by parties for the phrase "full set clean on board
bills of lading"); Nicoll v. Pittsvein Coal Co., 269 F. 968, 972 (2d Cir. 1920) ("[T]here is no
doubt at all that ambiguity in phrase is not necessary to let in evidence of usage."); Stock &
Grove, Inc. v. City of Juneau, 403 P.2d 171 (Alaska 1965) (Trial court dismissal reversed and
remanded for proof of custom. Defendant's contention that proof of custom could come in only
where there was ambiguity was rejected.). Moreover, where different inferences may be drawn,
summary judgment is inappropriate.
120. 75 F.3d at 951.
121. Id. at 957.
122. Banca del Sempione v. Suriel Fin. N.V., 852 F. Supp. 417 (D. Md. 1994), rev'd sub
nom Sempione v. Provident Bank, 75 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1996).
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amendments to the letter of credit, because the parties did not intend them to be
amendments.'2 It noted further that since UCP Article 10(d) provides that a letter
of credit cannot be amended without the agreement of the issuing bank,, the
confirming bank, and the beneficiary, there was no valid amendment because the
confirming bank, Manufacturer's, had not agreed to the amendment.'
24
The Fourth Circuit reversed, noting that summary judgment was inappropriate
when "[a]n ambiguous contract... cannot be resolved by credible, unambiguous
extrinsic evidence .... It concluded that issues concerning "the nature and
effect of Henry's letters (whether or not they amended the letter of credit) must
be submitted in a full evidentiary proceeding to the trier of fact-in this case the
jury, unless the jury demand is waived."' 126
The Fourth Circuit noted that application of these principles of interpretation
has been illustrated in the context of letters of credit. In Banque Paribas v.
Hamilton Industries International, Inc.,127 for example, the court reversed
summary judgment in a letter of credit case based on "the simple principle that
a contract dispute cannot be resolved on summary judgment when the meaning
of the contract depends on the interpretation of ambiguous documents and can
be illuminated by oral testimony."'28 The Fourth Circuit also cited with approval
Timber Falling Consultants, Inc. v. General Bank, '29 where the district court held
that summary judgment was inappropriate because the facts supported two
inconsistent but reasonable constructions of the letter of credit.'
While the court in Sempione held that the letter of credit must be interpreted
by a trier of fact since its terms were ambiguous, it interpreted the UCP as a
matter of law. It did so by deciding that no material disputed question of fact
existed. Although the court considered extrinsic evidence, including the
testimony of an expert witness, it found that the case relied upon by the district
court and the opposing party was not contrary to the position taken by the expert.
123. Id. at 432-33.
124. Id. at 431-32.
125. Sempione, 75 F.3d at 959 (citing World-Wide Rights, 955 F.2d at 245). While a letter
of credit is probably not a contract for all intents and purposes (for example, no consideration
is required for it to be binding on the issuer, Pillans v. Van Mierop, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B.
1765); U.C.C. § 5-105 (revised 1995)), courts typically consider it a contract for interpretation
purposes. See also, e.g., Timber Falling Consultants, Inc. v. General Bank, 751 F. Supp. 179
(D. Or. 1990) ("A letter of credit is also a contract, and therefore questions regarding the
meaning of a provision in a letter of credit are to be 'resolved by resorting to standard maxims
of contractual construction."') (quoting Exxon Co. v. Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, 889
F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1989)).
126. Sempione, 75 F.3d at 964.
127. 767 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985).
128. Id. at 383. The Second Circuit also holds that "[tihe same general principles [of
construction] which apply to other contracts in writing govern letters of credit." Venizelos,
S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1970).
129. 751 F. Supp. 179 (D. Or. 1990).
130. Sempione, 75 F.3d at 959.
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That meant there was no disputed material issue of fact that would require the
issue to go to the jury.'
Thus, the existence and scope of any standard practice which is contained in
a written trade code, such as the UCP, is a matter for the court if the extrinsic
evidence needed to understand it in the commercial context is unambiguous and
does not raise disputed material issues of fact. If it is disputed and creates
material issues of fact, or if different inferences can be drawn from it, the
evidence is for the jury.'
Interpreting the meaning of a usage of trade will almost inevitably involve
factual issues. Establishing that a practice is a usage of trade is dependant on
facts: What acts and circumstances tend to establish this particular practice as a
trade usage? Facts must be examined to determine the scope of the practice, and
whether the practice has the "regularity of observance ...as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question."'3
The necessary inquiry is heavily fact specific both as to the actual practice itself,
and as to its relevance to the specific transaction.' If any of these facts are
material, and disputed, then they cannot be determined by the court as a matter
of law.
131. Id at 960. The Fourth Circuit also reversed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment on the issues of negligent misrepresentation and fraud, holding these issues must be
submitted to ajury, unless the jury demand is waived. Id. at 964.
132. For any matter to go to a jury, the factual question must be material and disputed. Ex
Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) (explaining that no one is entitled in a civil case to
trial by jury, unless and except so far as there are issues of fact to be determined). In letter of
credit compliance cases, there will frequently be no disputed questions of fact, and the parties
will often make cross motions for summary judgment. Where the particular question at issue
is a practice set forth in a written trade code such as the UCP, for example, there might be no
dispute as to its nature or scope. The parties might stipulate that it was a standard practice. In
addition, a judge could determine, for example, with respect to a particular unambiguous
provision in the UCP, that it is so generally used in the banking community that no reasonable
jury could conclude that the particular practice was not standard practice.
133. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1989).
134. Curiously, it has been asserted that all extrinsic evidence is for the court as a matter of
law, even where such evidence may raise disputed issues of fact. See, e.g., comment in LETTER
OF CREDIT UPDATE, Feb. 1996, at 6:
The revision also encourages courts to hear from authorities on such questions of
interpretation and implicitly provides the assurance that resort to such expert
opinion and its possible divergence does not give rise to an issue of fact
appropriate for the jury but merely one of interpretation as in situations where
there are two or more possible interpretations available.
This view does not appear to have any support in the applicable law governing interpretation
of written instruments, which is based on the constitutional requirement that factual issues be
determined by juries. The statement that the revision "implicitly" supports a view that juries
will not decide questions of fact appears to refer to the official comment, which asserts, in
conflict with U.C.C. § 1-205, that courts are empowered to identify and determine the nature
and scope of standard practice. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
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4. Interpreting Practices Not in Writing, or Not in a Trade
Code
Under U.C.C. section 1-205(2), the existence and scope of any standard
practice that is not contained in a written trade code is a matter for the jury, if a
material, disputed question of fact is at issue. Many practices of banks in dealing
with letters of credit are not contained in the UCP, and in fact are not contained
in any written form. If contained in written form, they may not be widely
distributed or adhered to.'35 The official comment refers to two forms of
"standard practice" other than the UCP: (1) rules published by associations of
financial institutions, and (2) local and regional practice.' 36
Following subsection 1-205(2), the jury would determine whether any pertinent
practice embodied in these published rules and local and regional practices had
"such regularity of observance... as to justify an expectation that it [would] be
observed with respect to the transaction in question."'37 The jury could consider
questions such as whether the published rules were widely distributed,
distributed to the particular bank in question, generally used in the banking
community, generally used during the particular time period in question, and
generally used by the particular bank in question for all of its transactions and for
this particular transaction. With respect to the local and regional practice, the
jury should similarly consider how widespread the practices were, and under
what circumstances and how frequently they were used. All of these factual
questions would be relevant to the jury's determination of whether the particular
practice was a "standard practice" with respect to the case at bar. With respect
to interpreting the meaning of any writing in connection with the practice, only
if the trier of fact first determined that the practice was a usage of trade as
defined in section 1-205(2), and determined that it was embodied in a "trade
code," would the interpretation of its meaning be a matter for the court. If,
however, there was evidence of ambiguity in the meaning of the rules, or
evidence that the rules were interpreted differently by different banks, so that a
material, disputed question of fact arose, the meaning of the rules in the
particular case would be a question for the trier of fact.
135. One of the problems with using "standard practice" of banks as the standard against
which bank conduct will be measured, is that other than the UCP, which obviously does not
contain all bank practices, there are few written sources describing banking practices. See Boris
Kozolchyk, Strict Compliance and the Reasonable Document Checker, 56 BROOKLYN L. REV.
45, 75 (1990); see also A Conversation with Kozolchyk re UCP Article 13(a) & the ICC's
National Banking Practices Initiative, supra note 74 (discussing efforts by the United States
Council on International Banking to identify standards for examination of documents).
Identifying and determining standard practice needs the assistance of testimony by witnesses.
In our adversarial system, it is not unusual for there to be conflicting evidence as to the proper
standard (or trade usage) against which conduct is to be measured. To decide the issue,
conflicting evidence must be weighed, demeanor evaluated, and credibility of witnesses
determined. These are all classic functions of the jury.
136. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 8 (revised 1995).
137. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1989).
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Thus, whether a written banking practice constituted a standard practice would
be a matter for the jury, unless it were so generally accepted in the particular
industry as a standard practice that there could be no reasonable factual question
on this issue. Even so, as with the interpretation of the UCP, underlying disputed
questions arising from the extrinsic evidence would present questions for the
jury. If the practice is not in writing, or in writing but not a "usage of trade," or
not in a "trade code or similar writing,"'38 then it is clearly for the jury to
determine the existence and scope of the practice.
B. Determining the Conduct of the Issuer
The central role of the civil jury is well established in American state and
federal practice. It is for the jury to determine the ultimate issues of fact between
the parties. Its function extends to two kinds of questions: (1) what happened,
that is, "what the parties did and what the circumstances were and (2) the
evaluation of these facts in terms of their legal consequences."' 39 Moreover,
mental as well as physical events can present questions for the jury. What a
person intended, thought, or believed, as well as what she did, may present
disputed issues of fact. Juries weigh evidence and determine credibility.14 Juries
are also charged with drawing inferences from what a person said, and from what
other evidence may show that he did. These inferences constitute fact finding.'4 '
Most letter of credit cases, which for the last forty years have been decided
without the benefit of revised section 5-108(e), have been decided on summary
138. Id
139. FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDuRE 267 (1965); see also Baltimore & Carolina
Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) ("[flssues of fact are to be determined by the
jury, under appropriate instructions by the court.").
140. The Supreme Court has stated:
[The weight and credibility of a witness's testimony] belongs to the jury, who are
presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence and their practical
knowledge of men and the ways of men; and so long as we have jury trials they
should not be disturbed in their possession of it, except in a case of manifest and
extreme abuse of their function.
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628 (1944) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (t891)).
It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It weighs the
contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses,
receives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The
very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and
conclusions that which it considers most reasonable. That conclusion, whether it
relates to negligence, causation or any other factual matter, cannot be ignored.
Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely
because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because
judges feel that other results are more reasonable.
Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R.R., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (citations omitted).
141. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of ajudge." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings ofAdministrators, Judges
and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 72-74 (1944).
1997]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
judgment motions. Trials are rather unusual. Jury trials are even more rare. This
is because in cases of documentary compliance, the facts are frequently not in
dispute. Nonetheless, over the whole range of letter of credit cases, factual
disputes do arise. It is the role of the trier of fact in those instances, either the
jury, or the judge if the parties have waived ajury, to determine the ultimate facts
by weighing the evidence, evaluating demeanor, determining the credibility of
witness testimony, and drawing the appropriate inferences.
C. Determining Whether the Issuer's Conduct Complied
With Standard Practice
The court decides questions of law which involve broad principles affecting
many civil cases, and the jury determines factually the existence and scope of a
trade usage or practice, resolves disputed questions of fact as to what actually
happened, and draws inferences based on evidence in the record. But who
determines whether conduct, which the jury found as a fact, is within the
accepted parameters of a particular trade usage or standard practice? In other
words, who determines whether the actual conduct met or failed to meet the
standard? Who applies the law to the facts?
Revised Article 5 would give this role to the judge: "Determination of the
issuer's observance of the standard practice is a matter of interpretation for the
court."'42 The prevailing view of the courts, however, is that this is an issue for
the jury. As noted above, the evaluation or appraisal of the facts in terms of their
legal consequences falls within the jury's province.'43 In negligence cases, for
example, even when the facts at issue are undisputed, it is for the jury, rather
than the judge, to determine whether negligence should be inferred from
defendants' conduct.' When specific conduct is measured against a standard,
it has historically been considered a question of fact for the jury. A duty to meet
a particular standard, or to conduct oneself in a particular way, may be imposed
142. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (revised 1995).
143. JAMES, supra note 139, at 267, 277.
144. There are literally hundreds of cases expressing this view, and they are found in every
American jurisdiction. See, e.g., Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Hugh Breeding, Inc., 232
F.2d 584, 589 (10th Cir. 1956) (determining whether engineer was negligent in driving train
at forty miles per hour when visibility was impaired by a snowstorm was question of fact for
the jury). One of the earliest U.S. Supreme Court cases to so hold was Sioux City & Pac. R.R.
v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 663-64 (1873) ("[A]lthough the facts are undisputed it is for
the jury and not for the judge to determine whether proper care was given, or whether they
established negligence."). In FELA cases, the Court has also upheld the right of the jury to
determine, along with other disputed questions of fact, "whether an employer's conduct
measures up to what a reasonable and prudent person would have done under the same
circumstances." Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 61-62 (1949); see also Rogers v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); Stone v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R., 344
U.S. 407 (1953).
[Vol. 72:681
U. C. C. AND SEVENTH AMENDMENT
by contract, by statute, by common law, or by industry practice. Whether there
has been a breach of that duty is a question of fact for the jury. 4 '
Moreover, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 146 what the
Supreme Court referred to as a fact question for the jury involved not only the
determination of the historical facts, but also the application of the law to those
facts. In that case, the jury had to determine the facts concerning plaintiffs
relationship to defendant, and, applying legal standards, whether plaintiff should
be deemed an "employee" within the meaning of the local Workmen's
Compensation Act.'47
The Court in Byrd noted that an essential characteristic of the federal system
is "the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial
functions between judge and jury and, under the influence-if not the
command-the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions
of fact to the jury."'4 8 The Supreme Court has consistently held that there is a
145. O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776, 780 (2d Cir. 1929) (deciding jury question whether
attorney conducted litigation in reasonably skillful manner); City of Philadelphia v. Welsbach
St. Lighting Co., 218 F. 721,729-30 (3d Cir. 1915) (holding that because contract required test
to be made by any method sanctioned by standard practice, it was proper for trial court to
submit to jury question of whether the method followed was the one contemplated by the
contract, and also whether tests made upon the device employed were pursuant to method
sanctioned by standard practice); Passarellol v. Lexington Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 1314, 1357,
1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that whether auditor's conduct was breach of obligation to
client under GAAS and GAAP, and whether it was a breach of engagement letter to fail to
disclose irregularities, were questions of fact for the jury); Society of Mt. Carmel v. Fox, 335
N.E.2d 588 (II!. App. Ct. 1975) (arguing defendant's alleged negligence is a question of fact
to be determined by application of professional standards and practices existing at the time the
building was designed); Morgan v. Engles, 127 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. 1963) (holding question
of whether defendant violated standard of practice by failure to refer plaintiff to orthopedic
specialist is for jury); Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 277 N.W. 226, 228
(Minn. 1937) (holding care required in performance of contractual duty is question forjury);
Guzzi v. Jersey Cent. Power & Lighting Co., 90 A.2d 23, 26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952)
(explaining question of whether the defendant's installation and maintenance of gas supply to
plaintiff's home conformed to standard practice in industry is question for jury); Arshansky v.
Royal Concourse Co., 283 N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) (holding whether operation
was performed in accordance with standard practice was question of fact for jury). Courts have
sometimes reserved to themselves the application of law to the facts in cases involving probable
cause, such as malicious prosecution cases and false imprisonment cases. Weiner, supra note
68, at 1910-18. There is also a minority view expressed in certain North Carolina cases, which
appears to give the trial judge authorization to pass upon the reasonableness of a party's
conduct, but these cases can also be explained by the court's belief that only one inference
could reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Id. at 1886-87.
146. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
147. Id. at 527; see also McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991) ("If
reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standard, could differ as to whether the employee
was a 'member of a crew,' it is a question for the jury."); Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, Inc.,
360 U.S. 273 (1959) (determining whether decedent was respondent's employee was jury
question); De Lahunta v. City of Waterbury, 59 A.2d 800 (Conn. 1948) (discussing whether
plaintiff had a constitutional right to have "undisputed facts" establishing the existence of
absolute nuisance determined by ajury).
148. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
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strong federal policy favoring jury trials.'4 9 Thus, a state law provision such as
revised section 5-108(e), even if not found to be unconstitutional, would not bind
the federal court. A federal judge would be required to determine which issues
should go to the jury in accordance with federal law and practice.'" As in Byrd,
the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment should cause a
federal court to disregard revised section 5-108(e)'s instruction that
"[d]etermination of the issuer's observance of the standard practice is a matter
of interpretation for the court,'' and allocate to the jury factual issues in
accordance with normal federal practice.
In state cases as well, courts have concluded that an application of law to fact
should be determined by jurors because such an application was considered a
question of fact under the relevant constitutional provisions.5 2 Even where facts
as to what happened were not in dispute, courts have found that it is nonetheless
for the jury to determine whether the conduct in question violated the standard,
because reasonable people could draw different conclusions.'
Courts have recognized that the determination of whether a party's conduct
meets a standard may involve several different questions, and that all are
questions for the jury. In Bryant v. Hall,'54 the Fifth Circuit stated that "[w]here,
as here, not only the facts constituting the conduct of the parties, but also the
standard of care which they should have exercised, are to be determined, the case
is entirely one offact and to be decided by the jury and not one of law for the
court."'55 Thus, the Fifth Circuit assigned to the jury not only finding the facts,
149. "The federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength." Simler
v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-49
(1830); Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-39). "Only through a holding that the jury-trial right is to be
determined according to federal law can the uniformity in its exercise which is demanded by
the Seventh Amendment be achieved." Id. at 222.
150. The federal judge is the "governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper
conduct and of determining questions of law. This discharge of the judicial function as at
common law is an essential factor in the process for which the Federal Constitution provides."
Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931). Thus, federal courts are not subject to
state constitutional provisions or statutes which govern jury trials. Id. at 94.
151. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (revised 1995).
152. Lofy v. Southern Pac. Co., 277 P.2d 423, 425 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (stating jury's
role to draw proper inferences when facts in dispute); De Lahunta, 59 A.2d at 800 (determining
question of whether traffic stanchion constituted a nuisance and was proximate cause of injury
was properly determined by jury); Orr v. Avon Fla. Citrus Corp., 177 So. 612, 614 (Fla. 1937)
(determining that it is for jury to find that defendant was negligent and was acting for company
within the scope of his agency); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 117 N.E.2d 74, 80 (II1. 1954)
(reviewing jury question whether circumstances surrounding defendant's violation of statute
may be proximate cause of damage that followed); Gard v. Sherwood Constr. Co., 400 P.2d
995, 1002 (Kan. 1965) (holding that issues of negligence and probable cause are for jury);
Guzzi v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 90 A.2d 23, 26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952)
(holding that it is jury question whether defendant's installation and maintenance of gas supply
conformed to standard practice in industry); Shobert v. May, 66 Pac. 466 (Or. 1901).
153. De Lahunta, 59 A.2d at 800, 803.
154. 238 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1956).
155. Id. at 787 (emphasis added).
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but also determining the standard of care, applying the standard to the facts, and
drawing appropriate inferences.
In a letter of credit case, an issuer has a duty to comply with a standard: the
"standard practice of financial institutions that regularly issue letters of
credit."' 56 When the question of whether the issuer met or failed to meet that
standard depends upon disputed questions of fact, or upon inferences drawn from
facts, it is the jury which should resolve the factual disputes, and draw the
appropriate inferences.
V. A COMPARISON WITH U.C.C. SECTIONS 2-302 AND 4A-
202(c)
The official comment to revised section 5-108(e) asserts that "similar rules in
Sections 4A-202(c) and 2-302" provide support for the decision to have judges,
not juries, determine the nature and scope of standard practice."15 A close look
at these sections shows that there is little or no support in these rules for
broadening the judge's sphere of decision and thereby constricting the jury trial
right.
U.C.C. section 2-302 pertains to an unconscionable contract or clause. It
provides that a court, as a matter of law, may find a clause or contract
unconscionable and refuse to enforce it.' The statutory delegation of this power
to the court does not, however, abrogate the constitutional right to a jury trial.
The issue of unconscionability has always been a question of equity, not law, and
therefore has always been a question for the judge." 9 There is no similarity
156. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (revised 1995).
157. Paragraph 5 of the official comment I to U.C.C. revised section 5-108(e) provides:
Identifying and determining compliance with standard practice are matters of
interpretation for the court, not for the jury. As with similar rules in Sections 4A-
202(c) and 2-302, it is hoped that there will be more consistency in the outcomes
and speedier resolution of disputes if the responsibility for determining the nature
and scope of standard practice is granted to the court, not to ajury. Granting the
court authority to make these decisions will also encourage the salutary practice
of courts' granting summary judgment in circumstances where there are no
significant factual disputes.
U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 1, para. 5 (revised 1995).
158. U.C.C. § 2-302 provides as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1989).
159. County Asphalt Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 444 F.2d 372, 379 (2d Cir.
1971). In this case, the Second Circuit, rejecting plaintiff's claim that ajury trial right on the
issue of unconscionability was guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
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between unconscionability, a matter of equity not entitled to a jury trial, and
revised section 5-108(e), a claim at law, where plaintiff seeks money damages,
and is entitled to a jury.
Moreover, the claim that section 4A-202(c)'" supports the decision in revised
section 5-108(e) to abrogate jury rights is surprising, to say the least. In fact, the
official comment to that section shows, by analogy, how revised section 5-108(e).
has gone beyond constitutional limits. Section 4A-202(c) deals with the
commercial reasonableness of a security procedure. The official comment to that
section (which is combined with the comment for 4A-203 and found following
4A-203), supports having a jury, rather than a judge, determine whether a bank's
conduct meets a given standard: "The issue of whether a particular security
procedure is commercially reasonable is a question of law. Whether the receiving
bank complied with the procedure is a question offact." 161
While there is a serious question whether, by legislation, commercial
reasonableness can constitutionally be made a question of law for the court,' 62 it
noted that- such an argument hardly merited consideration: "In 1791, when the [Seventh]
amendment was adopted, the discretionary power to grant equitable relief according to the
'conscience' of the chancellor was so unmistakably a matter for the equity side rather than the
law side of the court no further discussion of the constitutional ground is warranted." Id.
160. U.C.C. § 4A-202(c) (1989). Article 4A of the U.C.C., Fund Transfers, deals with
electronic transfers of funds.
161. U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4, para. 2 (1989) (emphasis added).
162. An analysis of whether section 4A-202(c) violates the right to ajury trial by making the
determination of "commercial reasonableness" a matter of law is beyond the scope of this
Article. It is interesting to note in passing, however, that the drafters of Article 4A took great
pains to try to explain why commercial reasonableness should be a question of law. The official
comment states, "[i]t is appropriate to make the finding concerning commercial reasonability
a matter of law because security procedures are likely to be standardized in the banking
industry and a question of law standard leads to more predictability concerning the level of
security that a bank must offer to its customers." U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4, para. 2 (1989). This
is quite a curious statement. First, no evidence, authority, or reference supports the statement
that bank security procedures are "likely" to be standardized. Second, the use of the term
"question of law standard" is quite novel. What is a "question of law standard"? Perhaps it is
the standard created when a fact question for the jury gets relabeled as a question for the judge.
There are a number of cases interpreting "commercial reasonableness" under Article 9, and
they basically send disputed fact questions to the jury. See Leasing Serv. Corp. v. River City
Constr., Inc., 743 F.2d 871 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (applying Alabama law) ("Generally the issue of
commercial reasonableness is a question for the jury." (quoting Henderson v. Hanson, 414 So.
2d 971 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982))). Where there are no disputes as to material facts, however, the
issue becomes a question of law. See In re Matter of Excello Press Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 905 (7th
Cir. 1989) (citing with approval Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Forte, 535 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2d App.
Div. 1988) ("Whether a sale was commercially unreasonable is, like other questions about
'reasonableness,' a fact-intensive inquiry .. ")); United States v. Conrad Publ'g Co., 589 F.2d
949. 954 (8th Cir. 1978) (stating "whether a sale of collateral was conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner is essentially a factual question"); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Cornelius &
Rush Coal Co., 508 F. Supp. 63, 67 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Credit Alliance Corp. v. David 0.
Crump Sand & Fill Co., 470 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Advanced Irrigation Inc. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 366 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1985) (The determination of commercial reasonableness
as a matter of law is only appropriate "where all of the inferences support the conclusion that
the sale was commercially reasonable. Questions of fact become questions of law when
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cannot be disputed, and the comment so states, that the bank's compliance with
that procedure is a question offact. Similarly, in revised section 5-108(e), the
interpretation of whether a particular practice is a standard practice in the
banking industry, when contained in a written trade code, may be a question of
law, but the bank's compliance with that standard practice is a question offact.
Thus, a comparison with 4A-202(c) serves to highlight how improper it is for
revised section 5-108(e) to provide that the court, rather than the jury, shall
determine whether the bank has complied with a particular standard.
In Revised Article 5, the drafters went a step further than had the drafters in
Article 4A. In so doing, the Article 5 drafters stepped over the boundaries of a
constitutionally protected right. In Article 4A, there is still an acknowledgement
in the official comment that the bank's compliance with a standard is a question
of fact for the jury. In revised section 5-108(e), the drafters pushed further to
create black letter law that relabeled the matter of a defendant's compliance with
a standard-historically a question of fact for the jury-as a "matter of
interpretation for the court."'
163
VI. ARGUMENTS MADE IN SUPPORT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REVISED SECTION 5-108(e)
In addition to the general policy reasons given in the official comment for
taking fact issues away from the jury, defenders of revised section 5-108(e) have
offered several arguments supporting the constitutionality of the provision. In a
written statement submitted to the New Jersey Law Revision Commission,
Robert M. Rosenblith, one of the Advisors to the Drafting Committee, stated as
follows:
Permitting juries to decide [on] an ad hoc basis the applicable standard or the
conclusion of observance was felt to be inappropriate for the stability of the
L/C business. While juries still could determine factually what the issuer did
or did not do, the Drafting Committee determined that the court should
determine preliminarily, as a matter of law, what the standards are and apply
reasonable men can reach but one conclusion." (citing City of Hazelton v. Daugherty, 275
N.W.2d 624, 627 (N.D. 1979))). In Bankers' Trust Co. v. J.V. Dowler, 390 N.E.2d 766 (N.Y.
1979), the court found commercial reasonableness as a matter of law, but based its decision on
the fact that "undisputed facts and irrefutable documentary evidence bearing upon each of the
elements of commercial reasonableness make it manifest that there could be no realistic
expectation that the Company would succeed in obtaining a factual or legal determination in
its favor." Id at 770. In other words, the court found no material disputed issue of fact.
It could be argued that a "commercially reasonable" sale is more likely to create factual
issues than a "commercially reasonable" security procedure. Even so, it does not justify taking
from the trier of fact the question of a commercially reasonable security procedure in those
cases when factual issues arise, as they inevitably will. Normally, of course, the question of
reasonableness is one for the jury. It is only for the court when the evidence is so clear that no
reasonable person could determine the issue in any way but one. See, e.g., Amfac v. Waikiki
Beachcomber Inv. Co., 839 P.2d 10 (Haw. 1992).
163. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (revised 1995).
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the facts determined by the fact finder to conclude whether or not the issuer
had observed the standards.16 4
Rosenblith concedes that the jury at least has a role in factually determining what
the issuer did. Even if the statute were to be read this way, however, this would
not resolve the constitutional defect. In most letter of credit cases, there will be
no dispute as to what the issuer did. The real dispute will center on (a) what the
standard practice is, and (b) whether the issuer's conduct complied with that
standard practice. Both of these issues, according to Rosenblith, are to be
determined by the court as a matter of law. As discussed above, however, this
would mean that any disputed material factual issues, as well as inferences that
could be drawn from the facts, would be denied jury review, in violation of the
constitutionally protected right to a jury trial. 6 '
In his written statement, Rosenblith's response to the concern that revised
section 5-108(e) might be-unconstitutional was to state that "there is nothing
inherently improper in parties agreeing to waive a jury trial in a commercial
dispute governed by a written agreement."'66 While this assertion standing on its
own is true, and parties to letter of credit cases frequently choose to waive their
rights to a jury, revised section 5-108(e) does not provide for a voluntary waiver
of a jury trial. Rather, it legislates that questions of fact be denied jury review
and decided by the court as a matter of law.
With respect to the waiver issue raised by Rosenblith, that concept is further
developed by Sandra Stem, one of the Uniform Commissioners from New
York. "'67 In Stem's article on Revised Article 5, she asserts that revised section
5-108(e) is not unconstitutional because it is not black letter law, but instead is
a default rule which operates in the absence of contrary agreement by the
parties."' The argument is that since Article 5 provides that certain provisions
such as revised section 5-108(e) can be varied, the parties can simply opt out of
revised section 5-108(e) by stating in the letter of credit that the determination
of the bank's observance of standard practice will be a matter for the jury. Under
this theory, if a beneficiary did not "opt out" by varying the provision, then it is
not unconstitutional for the default provision to operate to prevent him from
having a jury trial.'69
164. Statement of Robert M. Rosenblith to The N.J. Law Revision Commission (January 18,
1996) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal)[hereinafter Rosenblith Statement].
165. See discussion supra, part IV.
166. Rosenblith Statement, supra note 164.
167. Sandra Schnitzer Stem, Revised Article 5 Brings Uniformity, Predictability to Letters
of Credit, 143 N.J. L.J. 779 (1996).
168. Id. at 803.
169. This is essentially a waiver argument. The position is that parties waive their
constitutional right to a jury trial when they fail to vary the terms of a letter of credit to
specifically provide that determination of the issuer's observance of standard practice is a
matter for the jury. It is doubtful that such a claim of waiver would be upheld, however, since
failing to negotiate a change in a standard form letter of credit is not the kind of knowing and
voluntary act necessary to waive a constitutional right. In Brookhart v. Janis, the Court noted
that there is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights and for a waiver to be
effective "it must be clearly established that there was 'an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."' Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (quoting
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The problem with this argument is that labeling a provision a "default"
provision does not prevent it from being black letter law70 nor shield it from
constitutional scrutiny. If one were to accept the argument, then the vast majority
of provisions in the U.C.C. would be immune from constitutional challenge,
since they are "default rules."'17 1 Yet, the fact of being a "default rule" has not
prevented courts from scrutinizing various provisions of the U.C.C. which are
alleged to be unconstitutional. New York's highest court, for example, found
section 7-210, Enforcement of Warehouseman's Lien, unconstitutional under the
New York Constitution. 72 The fact that this provision could have been varied by
agreement of the parties did not prevent the New York Court of Appeals from
finding it unconstitutional.
Additional U.C.C. provisions which have been challenged as unconstitutional
include U.C.C. sections 9-503 and 9-504, concerning a secured party's right to
take possession and dispose of collateral. 17 3 While these challenges were not
successful, no case turned on the ground that these were "default" provisions
from which the parties had the opportunity to, but did not, opt out.
The important point is that Congress or a state legislature cannot circumvent
constitutional commands by imposing upon the individual the obligation to take
some affirmative step, failing which he must suffer the consequences of an
unconstitutional statute. In the trusts and estates area, for example, there are
"default rules" which only apply if someone dies without making a will. Such
statutes are not, however, immune from constitutional scrutiny. As an example,
one such "default rule" provided that if a person died intestate, males would be
preferred to females as administrators of the estate. Held up to constitutional
scrutiny, the statute could not pass muster, as the U.S. Supreme Court determined
in Reedy. Reed in 1971.4 It is no defense that the deceased could have "opted
out" of the unconstitutional "default rule" by making a will (and thereby
determining who would be the executor). Thus, if revised section 5-108(e) is
unconstitutional, as this Article suggests, the fact that a party could opt out of it
does not cure the constitutional defect.
175
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
170. "Black letter law," according to Black's Law Dictionary, is "[ain informal term
indicating the basic principles of law generally accepted by the courts and/or embodied in the
statutes of a particular jurisdiction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (6th ed. 1990). Revised
section 5-108(e) clearly sets forth a basic principle of law embodied in a (proposed) statute.
The fact that it can be varied does not mean it is not "black letter law."
171. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1995).
172. Svendsen v. Smith's Moving & Trucking Co., 429 N.E.2d 411 (N.Y. 1981).
173. See, e.g., Winfield v. Society Nat'l Bank, 845 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1988); Ancoren v.
Peters, 829 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1987); Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir. 1980); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
174. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Supreme Court struck down as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment an Idaho statute which gave preference to
males over females in becoming the administrator of an intestate's estate.
175. The editorial board of the New Jersey Law Journal suggested that a party's waiver of
a jury trial right by failing to make a timely jury demand, might lend some support to Ms.
Stem's position. Editorial, Inviolate (Sort 0J), 143 N.J. L.J. 980 (1996). The requirement of
a timely demand, however, is part of the orderly management of litigation before the court. It
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It has also been suggested that in determining whether a question goes to the
judge or the jury, there may be a complexity exception for letter of credit cases
on the basis that they are too complex to be considered by the jury.'76 For the
most part, cases which have been considered possibly too "complex" for a jury
are cases such as In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, '77 which involved
over 5 million documents, 150,000 pages in depositions, and a trial projected to
last two years, or In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation,1
78
which involved more than 20 million documents, 100,000 pages of depositions,
and a trial that was likely to take a year.'79 Appellate courts came to different
conclusions about whether these cases were too complex for a jury, 8 ' and the
Supreme Court has never squarely ruled on the issue.
While courts have different views on whether cases involving millions of
documents and year long trials are too "complex" for a jury,' letter of credit
cases simply do not have the same degree of complexity. Documents which are
material to the case are usually limited to those listed in the letter of credit. It is
rare that over ten different documents are required, and many credits will require
fewer than ten. There is no case law or law review article suggesting that letter
of credit litigation even approaches the level of difficulty of cases which some
courts have considered too "complex" for the jury.'82 Moreover, the issues
is no different from other procedural requirements parties must meet in the litigation process,
including, for example, the requirement that a defendant must answer a complaint in a timely
manner or be subject to a default judgment. It is quite different to require that private parties,
in their relationships with each other, must take certain affirmative steps, failing which, they
will be subject to a statute that denies constitutional rights.
176. See id. which expressed this concern. See also Comment, LETTER OF CREDIT UPDATE,
Feb. 1996., at 6 ("The allocation of powers between the court and jury with respect to the
interpretation of the UCP is somewhat more complex .... The source of the problem is the
provisions in the federal and many state Constitutions which preserve the right to trial by jury.
In commercial litigation, this often means that issues of considerable complexity are tried
before a jury which is unable to assess their import.").
177. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
178. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
179. See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 197-98 (1988).
180. The Third Circuit, in In re Japanese Electronic Products, overruled in part the district
court, finding due process precludes trial by jury when jury is unable to perform its task of
rational decision making with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the relevant legal
rules. In re Japanese, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit overruled the district
judge in In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, holding there was no complexity exception,
and that the case should go to the jury. In re U.S. Fin., 609 F.2d at 411.
181. Some commentators today believe there may no longer be a complexity exception to
jury trials in the federal courts. Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 47, at 1498-99. Some
limited support for having an exception appears in the Markman decision, in which the
Supreme Court in a patent case held that disputed terms of art in a claim construction were
more appropriate for judges than for juries because of the highly technical nature of patents.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996); see supra notes 82-111 and
accompanying text.
182. Studies reflecting the competency ofjuries in dealing with complex issues suggest there
is no basis for creating a "complexity exception" for removing complex cases from the jury.
GUINTHER, supra note 179, at 211-17 (citing study published by the Federal Judicial Center
of the United States Supreme Court in 1981); see also discussion supra part IV.A.3.a.
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involved, such as whether a particular conduct meets a standard, are exactly the
kind of issues juries routinely decide.'
VII. POLICY REASONS OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF
CONSTRICTING THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
In Revised Article 5, the drafters made the decision that the letter of credit
community was not well-served by juries, and that judges should determine the
outcome of letter of credit litigation.' By asserting in the official comment that
the court is supposed to determine what the standard practice is against which
bank conduct will be measured, and by mandating in the statute that the court as
a matter of law will measure and evaluate the bank's conduct to determine if it
meets the standard, the drafters virtually eliminated the role of the jury in
determining liability of a bank in a letter of credit case. The reasons given by the
drafters-promoting more consistent outcomes, speedier resolutions of disputes,
uniformity and predictability in letters of credit-should be examined to see
whether they provide a reasonable basis for constricting a litigant's access to a
jury, assuming for this purpose there is no constitutional violation.
There appear to be no studies which suggest that judges render more consistent
or predictable opinions in letter of credit cases than juries, and judges in such
cases are not remarkable for consistency or predictability." 5 Moreover, there are
183. See discussion supra part IV.A.3.a.
184. In an article in the New Jersey Law Journal, Sandra Stem, one of the Uniform
Commissioners for New York and a member of the Drafting Committee for Article 5, stated
as follows:
Banks have generally preferred... technical issues to be determined by courts
rather than juries.... [T]here was general consensus among participants in the
drafting process that determinations by judges would lead to a more consistent
pattern of decisions, and that legal predictability in the United States facilitates
acceptance of our letters of credit abroad.
Stem, supra note 167, at 803.
185. Compare, for example, court decisions concerning whether a bank can assert that
documents are not in compliance with terms and conditions of a letter of credit if it has failed
to notify presenter of discrepancies in a timely manner: Lease Am. Corp. v. Norwest Bank
Duluth, N.A., 940 F.2d 345, 349 (8th Cir. 1991) (Failure to notify borrower of defects
precludes claim that documents are not in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
credit.); Bank of Cochin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 808 F.2d 209, 210 (2d Cir.
1986) (Issuing bank's failure to notify opposing bank of discrepancies in letter of credit
precluded issuing bank from asserting noncompliance claim.); Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d 680, 683, 686 (2d Cir. 1983) (Issuing bank was entitled to
strict compliance even where it was aware of discrepancies in letter of credit and agreed upon
terms.); Crocker Commercial Serv. v. Countryside Bank, 538 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. II. 1981)
("[R]easonable compliance with a letter of credit entitles beneficiary to payment." (emphasis
in original)). Ironically, while on the one hand the drafters claimed judge decisions were more
"predictable" than jury verdicts, on the other hand, they lacked confidence in a court's ability
to consistently interpret letter of credit law using a broad good faith standard. They adopted
instead the narrow "honesty in fact' standard, usually the standard reserved for non-merchants.
See Stern article, supra note 167, which asserts that without extensive modification of the
statute, courts could not apply a "fair dealing" standard without producing "unpredictable"
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simply not enough letter of credit cases decided by juries to have any significant
effect on making the outcomes more predictable in such cases. Few letter of
credit cases go to trial, and when there is a trial, parties may choose to waive the
right to a jury. Furthermore, the majority of letter of credit cases are decided on
summary judgment motions. It is very difficult to see how eliminating the small
number of jury trials a year in letter of credit cases in this country could
significantly affect predictability or consistency.
It also does not appear that judge trials in civil cases result in "speedier
resolutions" than jury trials. Bench trials may be concluded sooner because they
can be scheduled around other work of a court, no time is consumed in picking
a jury, and there may be fewer skirmishes about evidence since rules of evidence
tend to be applied less strictly. Nonetheless, a jury gives its verdict promptly, so
it can go home, while a judge may "reserve" his decision for weeks, or months,
or longer. In addition, in reviewing a jury-tried case, appellate courts feel more
constrained in overturning judgments based on jury verdicts than on findings
made by judges, since there is no constitutional problem of possible invasion of
the right to trial by jury in rejecting a judge's findings. 6 Thus, the ultimate
resolution of a civil trial by a judge, who reserves decision, or whose findings are
rejected at the appellate level, could be much slower than one by a jury whose
fact findings are generally not reviewable.
Moreover, while studies have shown that more courtroom days are usually
spent in ajury trial than in a bench trial,'87 the "speed of resolution" of a matter
does not depend upon courtroom days, but upon the total length of time a case
is in the system. That amount of time is no more for a jury case than for a non-
jury case.'
The drafters also claimed that by changing a fact issue into a matter of law,
more cases would be decided on summary judgment motions rather than by going
to trial. While it is true that granting summary judgment does eliminate time
spent in a trial, most letter of credit cases are already decided on summary
results.
186. See DELMAR KARLEN & CHARLES W. JOINER, TRIALS AND APPEALS 254-55 (1971).
Moreover, in cases where the judge is both trier of fact as well as determiner of law, a particular
issue which is determined as an issue of law can be more easily reversed at the appellate level.
To reverse an issue of law, the appellate court just has to disagree with the decision below. To
reverse an issue of fact, the appellate court uses a higher, "clearly erroneous" standard. FED.
R. Civ. P. 52(a). Since parties often waive their jury trial rights in letter of credit cases, more
issues are decided by judges as triers of fact than juries. Ironically, the drafters' decision to
relabel a question of fact as a question of law, if enacted by most state legislatures, will make
it much easier for the trial court's decision to be reversed on appeal.
187. GUINTHER, supra note 179, at 156-58.
188. An analysis of a data base of 3.5 million federal district court civil cases terminated
over the last 16 fiscal years, showed that the mean judge-trial case spent 755 days on the
docket, while the mean jury trial case terminated in 678 days. Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M.
Clermont, Courts in Cyberspace, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 94, 97 (1996); Theodore Eisenberg &
Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or by Judge: Which is Speedier?, 79 JUDICATURE 176, 178
(1996). In 1980, the median time required in federal court to handle a case from beginning
through trial was 15 months for bench trials and also 15 months for jury trials. GUINTHER,
supra note 179, at 157.
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judgment motion. There is no available evidence, either anecdotal or statistical,
which would suggest that trials in letter of credit cases are unduly long, or that
eliminating the few trials that take place, either bench trials or jury trials, would
have any significant impact upon letter of credit litigation.
With respect to uniformity, a primary goal of the sponsors of uniform laws,
NCCUSL and the ALI, 8 9 is to obtain passage of the laws they propose without
non-conforming amendments. Drafting a provision which, even if it were
ultimately determined not to be unconstitutional, appears unconstitutional under
both state and federal law, does not serve the goal of promoting uniform adoption
by the states. Non-uniform adoption would of course lead to non-uniform
handling of letter of credit cases.' To obtain a smooth passage without non-
uniform amendments, it would seem important to ensure that the various
provisions did not violate state or federal constitutional guarantees. Creating
constitutional issues, and leaving them for the courts to resolve, seems at odds
with the purposes of NCCUSL and the ALI, which are highly prestigious bodies
entrusted with drafting fair, effective, and one would think, clearly
constitutional, uniform laws.'
The policy reasons proposed by the drafters for eliminating juries under
Revised Article 5-predictability, speed, uniformity, complexity-have no
189. The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), and
the American Law Institute ("ALL"), are private, non-legislative entities which participate in
the drafting process of uniform state laws. The Commissioners are chosen in each state, usually
by appointment by the governor. ALI members are elected by the existing membership, and
tend to be professors, judges, partners in major law firms, or in-house counsel for large
corporations. Each organization provides members to the Permanent Editorial Board, which
has an ongoing supervisory role with respect to the uniform law process. In addition to the
individuals from both organizations who make up the drafting committee for each uniform law,
there are "advisors" and "active participants" who contribute to the drafting process.
190. The uniformity sought is also, of course, uniformity with the UCP. Since most juries
in letter of credit cases will be dealing with letters of credit governed by the UCP, a basic
question is whether jury participation will cause non-uniformity of application of the UCP.
Again, this depends upon whether there is a significant difference in fact findings by juries and
by judges in letter of credit cases. No study has been done on this subject, nor is there any
study available as to whether jury verdicts or bench trials more frequently result in reversals
in letter of credit cases.
191. This author has spoken with approximately a dozen individuals who were either
members of the drafting committee, advisors, or active participants in the drafting process. The
view appears to be widely held that whether or not revised § 5-108(e) is unconstitutional, the
better way is simply to approve it, work for its adoption, and leave it to private parties to
challenge it in court if it is unconstitutional. This willingness to push to the grey areas of
constitutionality and beyond, particularly with no solid justification for doing so, tends to give
credence to concerns of various academics and practitioners about the dominance of
organizations such as the ALI and NCCUSL by special interests. Corinne Cooper, The
Madonnas Play Tug of War with the Whores or Who is Saving the UCC, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
563 (1993); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism and the Uniform Laws
Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 86 (1993);
Donald Rapson, Who is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About the U.CC.
Revision Process in the Light (and Shadows) of Professor Rubin's Observations, 28 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 249 (1994); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some
Notes on the Process of Revising UC.C. Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 743 (1993).
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substance with respect to letter of credit litigation, where already most cases are
decided on summary judgment motion, often on cross-motions for summary
judgment. Thus, one might wonder what is really driving the decision. It appears
to be part of a more general movement to constrict as much as possible, if not
eliminate, the civil jury trial in commercial cases. In both section 4A-202(c),
where the issue of commercial reasonableness is declared to be a matter of law,
and in revised section 5-108(e), where determining the issuer's compliance with
a standard is declared to be a matter of law, issues which have traditionally been
questions for the jury have now been relabeled as matters for the court. 92
There are indications that such efforts are continuing with respect to other
U.C.C. revisions. A memorandum dated March 7, 1996 to the U.C.C. Article 2
Drafting Committee and Advisors from the Subcommittee on Consumer Issues
of the U.C.C. Article 2 Drafting Committee refers to an "Attached Draft of a
Statement on the Treatment of Consumer Issues in a Revised U.C.C. Article 2."
Referring to this draft, the memorandum states that: "[w]hile it is still a draft, the
paper now reflects at least preliminary agreement of the Subcommittee on the
best way to deal with consumer issues in the Article 2 Project."' 93 The view of
the "best" way to deal with the issue of jury trials with respect to consumer
issues is found in the draft statement: "[S]ubject to constitutional restrictions,
consideration should be given to drafting provisions such as U.C.C. section 2-
302 by which courts, not juries, are to make critical judgments about
performance or relief for consumers." The Subcommittee's view that this is the
"best" way to deal with consumer issues causes one to question, best for whom?
Probably not for consumers. And while lip-service is given to "constitutional
restrictions," reference is made to section 2-302 as a general model, rather than
as a model only for issues like unconscionability, which have historically been
decided in equity. This suggests there will be an effort to draft provisions similar
to U.C.C. section 2-302 with respect to issues based in law rather than equity, as
the drafters have done in section 4A-202(c) and revised section 5-108(e), in
order to withdraw from juries issues traditionally decided by them in actions at
law.
In the draft of new U.C.C. Article 2B, dealing with licenses such as computer
software agreements and the like, there is another example of "commercial
reasonableness"-traditionally a question of fact-being denominated a matter
for the court. Section 2B-113(b) provides: "Commercial reasonableness of an
authentication procedure is a question of law to be determined by the court in
light of the commercial circumstances, the purposes of the authentication
procedure, the relative position of the parties and the procedures in general use
for similar types of transactions or messages."' 94 In light of all the issues and
circumstances to be considered in determining commercial reasonableness, it
192. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
193. Memorandum from the Subcommittee on Consumer Issues of the U.C.C. Article 2
Drafting Committee and Advisors to the U.C.C. Article 2 Drafting Committee and Advisors
(March 7, 1996) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
194. U.C.C. § 2B-133(b) (1996) (Proposed Draft) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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appears likely that genuine, disputed factual issues could arise. If so, such issues
should be for the jury, not the court.
In the "Selected Issues" section following the draft of section 2B-1 13, there
is an acknowledgment that this provision is modeled after sections 4A-201 and
202. Comment 4 seems to suggest, however, that factual issues would be even
more likely to arise under this provision than under section 4A-202(c):
Since Article 2B deals with a more open environment and multiple parties of
differing sophistication, resources and bargaining power, rather than only
with banks and customers, the "authentication system" concept does not have
the entirely dominant impact that security system has in Article 4A. It is
simply not reasonable to anticipate that all parties engaged in transactions
covered by this article will arrive at or even consider using agreements to
establish specific procedures for authentication.' 95
Given the likelihood that disputed factual issues as to commercial reasonableness
may arise among the "multiple parties of differing sophistication, resources and
bargaining power," it is not clear why the drafters believe that the withdrawal of
such factual issues from the jury by statute can pass constitutional scrutiny.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the pros and cons of civil jury
trials generally. It is worth noting, however, that opponents of the civil jury
rarely, if ever, point to any studies which support their criticism of the process.
John Guinther, in his book, The Jury in America, notes, however, that the single
significant research study designed to assay the abilities ofjuries in complicated
cases concluded that:
Judges and lawyers were uniformly complimentary of the diligence of the
juries. With slightly less consensus, they also affirmed the validity of the
juries' deliberative processes .... Almost without exception, respondents
who acknowledged the existence of difficult issues in their jury trials also
mentioned explicitly that the jury had made the correct decision or that the
jury had no difficulty applying the legal standard to the facts. '96
Thus, whatever the reason may be for opposing juries, a valid reason cannot
be based on the issue of jury competence. In letter of credit cases, it cannot be
based on predictability, because there are too few jury trials to have an effect
upon predictability. One possible source of opposition to juries may be simply
the preferences of the economically powerful, who believe that judges more than
juries will tend to identify with and maintain the advantages of those in power.
This was true under English rule, and was one of the reasons that caused the
American states to insist upon a jury trial right. The concern over the jury trial
right was, in fact, the initial impetus for the entire Bill of Rights.' 97 It is to
prevent restrictions or contractions of the constitutional guarantee that courts
scrutinize carefully any abridgement of the right to a jury trial.'98
195. Id.
196. GUINTHER, supra note 179, at 213 (quoting study published by the Federal Judicial
Center of the United States Supreme Court in 1981) (emphasis added by Guinther).
197. Id. at 31; In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411,420 (9th Cir. 1979).
198. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) ("Maintenance of the jury as a
factfinding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to ajury trial should be scrutinized with
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Revised section 5-108(e) is unconstitutional because it paints with too broad
a brush, removing from the jury all disputed questions of material fact
concerning whether the issuer breached its duty to observe standard practice of
financial institutions that regularly issue letters of credit. '99 In any given case, of
course, a particular issue governed by revised section 5-108(e) might be
undisputed, unambiguous, or raise no issue of material fact. In such a case, the
issue could properly be decided by the court as a matter of law. But revised
section 5-108(e) commands the judge to determine all matters pertaining to
whether an issuer breached its duty, whether or not genuine disputed issues of
material fact are present. Its effect is to remove from the judge the obligation to
determine whether certain issues are material factual ones which must be decided
by the jury.
Is it possible to read the statute in a way that is constitutional? The official
comment pertaining to the interpretation of revised section 5-108(e)00 is not law,
so it could be disregarded.2"' In that case, a court would no longer assume the
duty of determining the existence and scope of standard practice, except to the
extent consistent with section 1-205(2). It is more difficult, however, to deal with
the critical middle sentence of revised section 5-108(e): "Determination of the
issuer's observance of the standard practice is a matter of interpretation for the
court." While the plain meaning appears to be that the court will determine both
the bank's conduct and whether it meets the standard, arguably, the sentence
could be read so that the question of the bank's actual conduct would be a jury
question. This leaves the question of whether it is unconstitutional for the court
to determine as a matter of law whether the bank's conduct met the required
standard. Even if the jury had determined both the standard and the conduct, the
application of the standard to the conduct could depend upon different inferences
to be drawn from the evidence presented.2 2 In that case, the Constitution
mandates that the jury apply the standard.
For the sentence to pass constitutional muster, it would have to state:
"Determination of the issuer's observance of the standard practice is a matter of
interpretation for the court, unless there are disputed issues of material fact, or
unless different, conflicting inferences could be drawn from the evidence
presented." As drafted, the sentence contracts the jury's role in deciding disputed
factual issues and in drawing inferences from the evidence. This is an
impermissible abrogation. Constitutional jurisprudence makes clear that the court
cannot impinge upon a constitutionally protected right either directly or
indirectly. The United States Supreme Court has held, "[t]he Seventh
Amendment ... requires that questions of fact in common law actions shall be
settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume directly or indirectly to take
utmost care.").
199. This duty is imposed by the first sentence of revised section 5-108(e): "An issuer shall
observe standard practice of financial institutions that regularly issue letters of credit." U.C.C.
§ 5-108(e) (revised 1995).
200. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 1, para. 5 (1995).
201. While this may be possible in theory, in practice, judges tend to be very deferential to
such official comments. See supra notes 56, 60.
202. See discussion supra part IV.C.
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from the jury or to itself such prerogative.""2 3 It is clear that if revised section 5-
108(e) stated that there would be no jury trials on issuer liability in letter of
credit cases, this would be a direct violation of the constitutional right to a jury
trial. Instead, however, revised section 5-108(e) accomplishes this result
indirectly. As noted above, it is not permissible to withhold from the jury
indirectly what cannot be withheld directly, without violating the constitutional
guarantee of ajury trial.
VIII. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO REVISED SECTION 5-
108(e) AND TO THE OFFICIAL COMMENT
In order not to impinge upon the constitutional right to a jury trial in letter of
credit cases, NCCUSL or any individual state could simply delete the second
sentence of revised section 5-108(e).2°4 The section would then read as follows:
"An issuer shall observe standard practice of financial institutions that regularly
issue letters of credit. The court shall offer the parties a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence of the standard practice."
Eliminating the overreaching second sentence would leave judges with the
ability to follow their normal practice and the established jurisprudence of
federal or state constitutional law. Before trial, the court would typically decide
motions for summary judgment. If genuine issues of material fact existed as to
what was standard practice, what the issuer did, or whether the issuer observed
the standard practice, then those issues of fact would be tried to a jury, unless the
parties had waived ajury. If ajury was waived, the fact issues would be tried to
a judge. Summary judgment would be granted if no genuine issues of material
fact existed as to any of these questions.
If the second sentence of revised section 5-108(e) is deleted, the official
comment relating to it should be of no effect. To be clear that the official
comment is not suggesting an unconstitutional interpretation of the statute or a
practice in violation of U.C.C. section 1-205(2), NCCUSL or the Permanent
Editorial Board might want to consider either a modification of the official
comment or simply delete the offending paragraph altogether. The pertinent
paragraph begins, "Identifying and determining compliance with standard
practice are matters of interpretation for the court, not the jury."20 5 It should be
replaced, if at all, with a comment which harmonizes with other U.C.C.
provisions, existing case law, and constitutional jurisprudence, such as the
proposal set forth below:
The issue of what is a standard practice of financial institutions that regularly
issue letters of credit may be a question of fact or a question of law. If the
practice at issue is set forth in a written codification of trade usage, such as
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, then the
203. Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
204. The second sentence is: "Determination of the issuer's observance of the standard
practice is a matter of interpretation for the court." U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (revised 1995).
205. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. I, para. 5 (revised 1995); see supra notes 59-63 and
accompanying text.
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meaning of the writing is a question for the court.2? 6 If extrinsic evidence
must be presented to understand the practice, it is a matter for the court if it
is unambiguous and raises no disputed questions of fact. If the extrinsic
evidence is ambiguous or changing, raises questions of fact, or constitutes
evidence from which more than one inference could be drawn, it is a matter
for the jury. If a practice is contained in a writing that is not as widely
accepted and utilized as the UCP, then the question of its existence, scope,
and whether it is a trade usage or standard practice is a question of fact for
the jury. If a practice is not in writing, determination of the existence and
scope of the practice and whether it is a standard practice are questions for
the jury. As in section 4A-202(c), a determination of whether the issuer has
complied with the standard practice is a question of fact for the jury.
By adopting an amended version of revised section 5-108(e), legislatures will
not offend the constitutional principle of the right to a jury trial. Parties may
always, of course, choose not to ask for a jury trial in a letter of credit case, as
in other cases. But the party who wants his case submitted to a jury should have
that right.
There is an obvious policy reason in support of the decision not to abridge jury
trial rights. That reason is that individual constitutional rights are more important
than efficiency, speed of resolution, predictability, or uniformity, and they should
not be given up easily.0 7 The right to a jury trial was considered critical by our
eighteenth-century forebears, and courts and judges up to the present day have
asserted that a constitutional right, "once gained, must be zealously guarded, for"
when it is not, it "tend[s] to become [a] mere privilege which those in power can
remove when they find the conferring of [it] no longer convenient to their
purposes."
20 8
Courts are constitutionally mandated to determine whether a particular issue
in a letter of credit case is one of fact or one of law, in accordance with well-
established precedent. If a question is factual, it cannot be legislated to be a
question of law without diluting the constitutional guarantee of a right to jury
trial.
206. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1996).
207. As Judge Gibbons noted in his dissent in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation, "the provisions of the Bill of Rights which limit the way in which the federal courts
conduct their business are designed to promote values other than efficiency. The inefficiencies
which those provisions impose on the system are a small price to pay for the vindication of the
values which the Bill of Rights advances." 631 F.2d 1069, 1091 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
208. GUINTHER, supra note 179, at I. Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated that "[t]he right of
trial by jury in civil cases at common law is fundamental to our history and jurisprudence."
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 388 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As Judge
Arnold has explained:
It is almost impossible to exaggerate the centrality of the institution of the jury to
almost all of the important episodes of Anglo-American legal history. Many of the
central ideas of the American and English common law owe their origin to the
fact that the jury was the chief mechanism for trying factual disputes. It is the
single most important institution in the history of Anglo-American law.
Morris Sheppard Arnold, The Civil Jury, A Historical Perspective, in THE AMERICAN CIVIL
JURY 9, 10 (1987).
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